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CITIZENS, THEIR RIGHTS AND IMMUNITIES.

proves injurious to its citizens. A statute is valid which
makes it unlawful for any person to manufacture, sell, or
offer for sale, any butter or cheese or article designed to take
the place of these articles, produced from any compound other
than unadulterated milk or cream. Such a statute of a State
is not a'violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, as it is entirely within the police power of
the State to protect the public health. The question, whether
the manufacture of oleomargarine is, or may be, conducted
in such a way as to require the suspension of the business
rather than its regulation, is one of fact and of public policy
which belong to the legislative department to determine. If
such legislation is unwise or unnecessarily oppressive, the
remedy is an appeal to the Legislature or to the ballot-box,
and not to the judiciary. The judiciary department must not
give effect to statutory enactments plainly forbidden by the
Constitution. A statute does not deny equal protection of
the laws when the same penalties and burdens are imposed
upon all persons engaged in the same business: -Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678.
D. H. PINGREY.
Bloomington, Ills.

RECENT

AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

,Supreme Court of Tennessee.
BLOCK v. MERCHANTS' DESPATCH TRANSPORTATION CO.
A despatch company cannot by special contract exempt itself from liability
for the loss or injury of goods which it has undertaken to carry, where such
loss or injuryis caused by the negligence of a railroad company it has engaged
to transport the goods or by the negligence of the servants or employ~s of
such railroad.

ERRoR to the Circuit Court of Davidson County;
REED,

FRANK

T.

Judge.

.Riced- Bell, for plaintiff in error.

Smith & Allison, for defendant in error.
This action was brought in the Circuit
CALDWELL, J.
Court of Davidson County by Block Bros. against the Mer-
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chants' Despatch Transportation Company as a common carrier, to recover the value of a certain case of merchandise.
Verdict and judgment were for the plaintiffs and the defendant has appealed in error. The goods were received by the
defendant in the city of New York, under contract to deliver
to the plaintiffs at Clarksville, Tennessee, for a stipulated
sum. They were transported to Louisville, Kentucky, over
several lines of railroad, in a car belonging to the defendant,
and at that point they were delivered to the Louisville and
Nashville Railroad Company for transportation to point of
destination. The goods were never delivered at Clarksville,
but were lost by the Louisville and Nashville Company in
some manner, and at some time and place not shown. The
shipment was made under the following receipt and bill of
lading:Naw Yonx, March 18, 1882.

"Rec'd from E. S. Jaffray & Co., in apparent good order, the

following package marked as in the margin, viz: 282. Block
Bros., Clarksville, Tenn., one case mdse. Bill of lading from
New York to Clarksville, of first-class goods; 96 cts. per 100
lbs. To be forwarded to Clarksville under the following
conditions: It being expressly understood and agreed that in
consideration of issuing this true bill of lading and guaranteeing a through rate, the Merchants' Despatch Transportation
Co. reserves the right to forward said goods by any railroad
line between point of shipment and destination.

*

*

*

It is

further stipulated and agreed that in case of any loss, detriment, or damage done or sustained by any of the property
herein receipted for, during such transportation, whereby any
legal liability or responsibility shall or may be incurred, that
company alone shall be held answerable therefore, in whose
actual custody the same may be at the happening thereof. * * *
MCGEAGEN, Agent."
[Signed.]
The contention of the defendant in the court below was
that these stipulations in the bill of lading relieved it from
liability for the loss of plaintiffs' goods; and the trial judge's
charge with respect thereto is now assailed as erroneous. The
Court charged that the latter of these stipulations was "renVOL. XXXVI.-72
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dered void" by the former; that by the former, reserving to
the defendant "the right to forward said goods by any railroad line between point of shipment and destination," the
defendant made such railroad line its agents, and that "the
law, on the grounds of public policy, would not allow it to
stipulate exemption from liability for the consequences of the
negligence of its agents, or their failure to do their duty."
This instruction properly treats the defendant as a common
carrier. The duties which it undertakes, and which it holds
itself out to the public as willing to undertake and perform
give it that character. In very many cases it has been expressly adjudged to be a common carrier, and in others, such
has been assumed to be its character, without a discussion of
the question. We cite a few of these cases: Trawnportation
Co. v. Gornforth, 3 Colo. 280; s. c. 25 Amer. Rep. 757;
-Robinsonv. Transportation Co., 45 Iowa, 470; Stewart v. Transportation Co.,47 Id. 229 ; Wilde v. Transportation Co., Id. 247;
Baneroft v. Trasportation Co., Id. 262; Transportation Co. v.
Bo&l, 80 IlL 473; TranTportation Co. v. Leysor, 89 Id. 4-3 ;
Transportation Co. v. Joesting, Id. 152. The writers say that
despatch companies are common carriers, and class them with
express companies, because of the many points of similarity
in their business, and the fact that they alike generally use the
vehicles of others in the transportation of freight. No law
is more familiar in England or America than that which
binds the common carrier to safely deliver to the consignees,
goods intrusted to it for transportation, unless prevented from
so doing by the act of God or public enemy. But in the last
half of a century, it has become equally well settled that the
common law liability of a common carrier may be limited in
its exterd, by express contract for that purpose. This right of
the carrier to limit its responsibility has been recognized by
the Supreme Court of the United States, since the decision,
by that court, in 1847, of the case of Varigation Co. v. Bank,
6 How. 344, and so far as we are informed, it is now upheld
in every State in the Union. To be valid, however, the
limitation must in all cases be reasonable; and to be reasonable, it must not stipulate for exemption from liability for
the consequences of the negligence of the carrier, its servants,

BLOCK v. MERCHANTS' DESPATCH TRANSPORTATION CO.

557

or agents: Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U. S. 357-384;
Coward v. Railroad Co., 16 Lea, 225; Dillard v. RailroadCo.,
2 Id. 288; Alarr v. Telegraph Co., 85 Tenn. 529.
In the case before us, the defendant insists that by the
stipulation in the bill of lading, it is relieved from responsibility for the loss of plaintiffs' goods. We have already seen
that the defendant, in the bill of lading, first reserved to
itself the right of selecting the particular line of railroad over
which it should transport the goods, and left the shippers or
owners no choice or discretion in that matter. This discretion,
the trial judge told the jury, constituted such railroad lines,
when selected, the agents of the defendant. Following this,
is the other stipulation that the company alone upon whose
line the goods might be lost or injured, should be liable
therefor. This, the trial judge told the jury, was invalid,
because it exempted the defendant from liability for the
negligence of those agents. If the first of these two propositions laid down by the trial judge be true, the other would
be sure to follow; that is to say, if the railroad lines over
which the goods were transported, were the agents of the
defendant, then its stipulation against its responsibility for
the negligence of those agents, would be invalid. For it has
been seen that a common carrier cannot lawfully contract
against the consequences of its own negligence, and upon
fimiliar principles, it can no more contract against the consequences of the negligence of its agents, because their negligence is, in law, its negligence.
The contract of shipment was made by the defendant, in
its own behalf for the whole route, and not on behalf of others
or for a part of the route only. For a specified sum, to be
paid to it for the whole service, the defendant promised
through transportation from New York to Clarksville, receiving the goods in its own name at point of shipment, and
binding itself to deliver them at point of destination. It did
not own or claim to own a single line of railroad, though
several were to be used in the performance of its contract.
It was compelled to rely upon others for the carriage of its
freight, and, for its own benefit, and not for the benefit of the
shippers, or consignees, it reserved to itself the selection of
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the lines it would use; the reservation necessarily embracing

the privilege on the part of the defendant making its own
arrangements as to terms, with such lines and carrying with
it the duty of paying them for their services. Such we
regard as a proper interpretation of the bill of lading, down
to and including the first stipulation. It shows the railroad
lines engaged in the transportation of the goods sued for, to
have acted for the defendant, and justifies the instruction that
those lines were, in this litigation, to be treated as the agents
of the defendant. The facts disclosed in the proof before the
jury, are entirely in harmony with this interpretation of the
bill of lading, and justify the conclusion of law. The goods
were conveyed to Louisville in defendant's own car, and Louisville is, by one of defendant's witnesses, called the terminus
of the line; but the manifest meaning of the witness, and the
truth of the matter is, simply, that the defendant's car was
transported to Louisville over railroad lines owned and
operated by others with whom it had contracted, and that its
car stopped at that point. At Louisville, the defendant
engaged the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company to
convey the goods thence to their destination, to complete its
contract for it. This engagement, as to others, the defendant
made on its own behalf, upon its own responsibility, and in
full recognition of its undertaking and duty to deliver the
goods at Clarksville. The nature of this engagement, and its
appreciation of the import of this duty, is best shown by the
language of defendant's agent and witness. He says: "D efendant had to forward these goods as any other shipper, and
it bad to pay whatever the Louisville & Nashville Railroad
Company would charge, even if it had been the entire amount
received from the shippers."
Despatch companies and express companies have, since the
earliest years of their existence, endeavored to put themselves
without the rules applicable to common carriers, and to shield
themselves against responsibility for the acts and omissions
of other carriers, whose conveyances they habitually use in
the performance of their own contracts. Their efforts in this
direction have been uniformly unsuccessful, because regarded
by the Courts as contrary to public policy. "It has been
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attempted," says Mr. Lawson, "on the part of express, forwarding, and despatch companies to evade the responsibility
of common carriers, on the ground that they are not the
owners of the vehicles employed in the transportation ; but this
pretence has not been permitted in the Courts. The names
which they assume are regarded as immaterial; the duties
which they undertake being the criterion of their liability.
They are, therefore, held to the responsibility of common
carriers, both when they are and when they are not interested
in the conveyances by which the goods are transported. If
an express company engaged to transport goods, sends them
by a railroad company employed by it to perform the service,
the railroad company becomes the agent of the express company, and the latter is liable to the consignor for its acts :"
Lawson, Cont. § 288. Mr. Hutchinson, speaking on the same
subject, says: "Because of this peculiarity in the employment
of the means of conveyance afforded by others, the contention
has been made by these companies that they were not
common carriers, but transacted their business in the character of forwarders, and were not therefore liable for losses
occurring from the negligence of those whom they thus employed. But this claim to exemption from the ordinary
liabilities of common carriers has not been sustained by the
Courts. Those subsidiary means of transportation have been
held to be the mere agencies employed by such companies, for
whose acts they are strictly responsible; and the carrier
whose vehicle is thus used becomes likewise liable, upon
principles of agency, to the owner of the goods, according to
the terms of his contract with his employer :" Hutch. Carr.
§ 70. The latter author, in the language just quoted, ha's
reference to express companies; but in the second section
following he says the same rules are applicable to despatch
companies, in the same manner and for the same reasons.
Then he says: "Other carriers, under the name of despatch
companies, fast freight lines, and the like, have also come into
existence, and conduct their business upon the same principle
as express companies, that is, by the employment of the
means of transportation furnished them by others, and to

which for some reasons the same rigid rule of responsibility
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as common carriers is applied :" Hutch. Carr. § 72. One of
the earlier leading cases on this subject was decided by the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1867. The defendants
there were express companies. Chief Justice BIGELOW, in
delivering the opinion of the Court, said: "But it is urged
in behalf of the defendants, that they ought not to be held to
the strict liability of common carriers, for the reason that the
contract of carriage is essentially modified by the peculiar
mode in which the defendants undertake the performance of
the service. The main ground on which this argument rests
is, that persons exercising the employment of express carriers
or messengers, over railroad and by steamboat, cannot, from
the very nature of the case, exercise any care or control over
the means of transportation which they are obliged to adopt;
that the carriages and boats in which the merchandise
intrusted to them is placed, and the agents or servants by
whom they are managed, are not selected by them, nor subject to their direction or supervision; and that the rules of
the common law, regulating the duties and liabilities of
carriers, having been adapted to a different mode of conducting business, by which the carrier was enabled to select his
own servants and vehicles, and to exercise a personal care and
oversight of them, are wholly inapplicable to the contract of
carriage by which it is understood between the parties that
the service is to be performed, in part at least, by means of
agencies over which the carrier can exercise no management
or control whatever. But this argument, though specious, is
unsound. Its fallacy consists in the assumption that at common law, in the absence of any express stipulation, the contract with an owner or consignee of goods delivered to a
carrier for transportation, necessarily implies that they are
to be carried by the party with whom the contract is made,
or by servants or agents under his immediate direction and
control. But such is not the undertaking of the carrier.
The essence of the contract is that the goods are to be carried
to their aestination, unless the fulfilment of their undertaking is prevented by the act of God, or the public enemy.
This, indeed, is the whole contract, whether the goods are to
be carried by land or water, by the carrier himself, or by
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agents employed by him. The contract does not imply a personal trust which can be executed only by the contracting
party himself, or, under his supervision, by agents and means
of transportation directly and absolutely within his control.
*

*

The truth is that the particular mode or agency by

which the services are to be performed does not enter into
the contract of carriage with the owner or consignor. The
liability of the carrier at common law continues during the
transportation over the entire route or distance over which he
has agreed to carry the property intrusted to him :" Buckland v. Express Co., 97 MNass. 126-130.
Some ten years later Justice STRONG delivered a very instructive opinion on the same general subject. He said: "The
exception or restriction to the common-law liability introduced
into the bills of lading by the defendants, so far as it is necessary to consider it, is that the express companies are not
liable in any manner, or to any extent, for any loss or damage
or detention of such package or its contents, or any portion
thereof, occasioned by fire. The language is very broad; but
it must be construed reasonably, and, if possible, consistently
with the law. If construed literally, the exception extends
to all loss by fire, no matter how occasioned-whether occurring accidentally, or caused by the culpable negligence of the
carriers or their servants, and even to all losses by fire caused
by wilful acts of the carriers themselves. That it can be
operative to such an extent is not claimed. Nor is it insisted
that the stipulation, though assented" to by the shippers, can
protect the defendants against responsibility for failure to deliver the packages according to their engagement, when such
failure has been caused by their own misconduct, or that of
their servants and agents. But the Circuit Court ruled the
exception did extend to negligence beyond the carrier's own
line, and that of the servants and agents appointed by them
and under their control-that it extended to losses by fire
resulting from carelessness of a railroad company employed
by them in the service which they undertook, to carry the
packages; and the reason assigned for the ruling was that the
railroad company and its employ~s were not under the control of the defendants. With this ruling we are unable to
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concur. The railroad company, in transporting the messenger
of the defendants and the express matter in his charge, was
the agent of somebody-either of the express company, or of
the shippers or consignors of the property. That it was the
agent of the defendants is quite clear. It was employed by
them aid paid by them. The service it was called upon to
perform was a service for the defendants; a duty incumbent
upon them and not upon the plaintiffs. The latter had nothing to do with the employment. It was neither directed
by them, nor had they any control over the railroad company
or its employes. It is true, the defendants had also no control over the company or its servants, but they were its employ6s ; presumably they paid for its service; and that service was directly and immediately for them. Control of the
conduct of an agency is not in all cases essential to liability
for consequences of that conduct. If any one is to be affected
by the acts or omissions of persons employed to do a particular service, surely it must be he who gave the employment.
Their acts become his, because done in his service, and by his
direction. Moreover, a common carrier who undertakes for
himself, to perform an entire service, has no authority to constitute another person or corporation the agent of his consignor or consignee. He may employ a subordinate agency,
but it must be subordinate to him, and not to one who neither
employs it, nor pays it, nor has any right to interefere with it.
If, then, the Louisville and lashville Railroad Company was
acting for these defendants, and performing a service for them
when transporting the packages they had undertaken to convey, as we think must be conceded, it would seem it must be
considered their agent. And why is not the reason of the
rule, that common carriers cannot stipulate for exemption
from liability for their own negligence and that of their servants and agents, as applicable to the contract made in these
cases as it was to the facts that appeared in the case of Bailroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U. S. 857. The foundation of the rule
is, that it tends to the greater security of the consignors, who
always deal with such carriers at disadvantage. It tends to
induce greater care and watchfulness in those to whom the
owner intrusts his goods, and by whom alone the needful care
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can be exercised. Any contract that withdraws a motive for
such care, or that makes a failure to bestow upon the duty
assumed, extreme vigilance and caution more probable, takes
away the security of the consignors, and makes common
carriers more unreliable. This is equally true, whether the
contract be for exemption from liability for the negligence
of agencies employed by the carrier to assist him in the discharge of his obligations, though he has no control over them,
or whether it be for exemption from liability for a loss occasioned by the carelessness of his immediate servant. Even
in the latter case, he may have no actual control.
Theoretically he has; but most frequently when the negligence of his
servant occurs, he is not at hand, has no opportunity to give
directions, and the negligent act is against his will. He is
responsible because he has put the servant in a place where
the wrong could be done. It is quite as important to the
consignor that the subordinate agency, though not a servant
under immediate control, should be held to the strictest care,
as it is that the carrier himself and the servants under his
orders should be. For these reasons we think it not advisable
to construe the exceptions in the defendants' bill of lading
as excusing them from liability for the loss of the packages
by fire, if caused by the negligence of the railroad company
to which they confided a part of the duty they had assumed :"
Bank v. Express Co., 93 U. S. 181-183.
This latter decision, which we regard eminently sound in
reason and in law, lays down the doctrine that controls the
case before us. There the undertaking of the express companies was to carry certain money from New Orleans, Louisiana, to Louisville, Kentucky, and deliver it to a certain
broker in the latter city. The express messenger placed the
packages of money in an iron safe, and the latter in the express car, for transportation to destination. Thus situated,
the money was transported over different lines of railroad,
and while being carried over the Louisville and Nashville
Company's line, a trestle gave way, in the night-time, precipitating the express car, which was then burned, together
with the money. The express messenger, who accompanied
the money, was rendered insensible by the fall and continued
VOL. XXXVI.-73
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so until the destruction was complete. Thereafter the broker
sued the express companies in the United States Circuit
Court, for the loss of the money. To these suits, the express
companies interposed the stipulation against liability for the
loss caused by fire, contained in their bills of lading, as a complete defence. The Court charged the jury that such stipulation relieved the defendants from the loss, if they and their
messenger were without fault or neglect; and further, that it
was not material to inquire whether or not the accident resulted from the negligence of the railroad company and its
agents. In other words, the instruction was, that the defendants were liable for the consequences of their own negligence
only, and not for a loss brought about by the negligence of
the railroad company. That instruction was disapproved,
and the contrary doctrine announced in the language we have
quoted somewhat at length. There, the contract was for
through transportation, in which the defendants were obliged
to use the vehicles and railroad lines of others; so it is here.
There, the defendants made their own employment of the
railroad companies, and paid them for their services; so it is
here. There, the defendants produced a special contract, and
by reason of it claimed that they were not liable for a loss
proceeding from the negligence of the railroad company; and
so it is in the case before us. There, the railroad company
was held to be the agent of the defendants, and for the consequences bf its negligence they were adjudged to be liable.
We so hold and adjudge here. A similar question was made
before the Supreme Court of Illinois in 1879. Goods intrusted to an express company for transportation were
destroyed by fire, while in transit upon a railroad. The Court
said: "But admitting the conditions in the receipt were
understandingly assented to by the shippers, and became a
binding contract between the parties, still defendants would
be liable for the full value of the goods, if the loss was owing
to the negligence on the part of the railroad company. An
express company, choosing such a corporation to do its business, will be chargeable to the same extent for the negligence
of the agent employed, as if the contract was primarily with
such agent, on the well-recognized principle that for culpable
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defects in carriages used by common carriers, the law makes
the carrier responsible:" Boscowitz v. Express Co., 93 Ill.
523; s. c. 34 Amer. Rep. 197. To the same effect is Christenson v. Express Co., 15 Minn. 270 (Gil. 208). See, also, Transportation Co. v. Oil Co., 63 Pa. St. 14.
It is to be observed that all these decisions, from which we
have made quotations, were made in cases against express
companies, whose messengers accompany their freight, and
not in cases against despatch companies, which have no such
messenger; but the doctrine therein announced, as we understand it, is not made to depend, in any sense, upon the presence of the messenger. The holding is, that the express
company is responsible for the negligence of the other carrier
upon whose line the loss or damage may occur, not because the
messenger is with the goods at the time, but because the other
carrier is the agent of the express company. Express companies and despatch companies alike use the conveyances of
others in the performance of their respective contracts with
their respective customers; and they have precisely the same
relation to those whose conveyances they so use. It is in this
view that we regard those decisions applicable in this case;
and it is for this reason just stated, that the text writers class
express companies and despatch companies together. This is
not like the case of a shipment over several connecting lines
of railroad, when the company first receiving the goods,
makes the contract for itself and others, and stipulates that
liability shall fall alone upon the particular line in whose custody the goods may be when the loss, if any, may be suffered.
There, the company first receiving the goods is in fact and by
the contract, a common carrier for only a part of the route, to
the end of its own line. Here, the defendant is in fact and
by the contract, a common carrier for the whole route, from
point of shipment to destination. There, that company limits itself to the faithful performance of duty as a common
carrier, only while the goods may remain upon its line and until delivered to the one next succeeding. To that extent, and
for that distance, but no further, does it hold itself out to the
consignor as a common carrier. For the balance of the route,
.it acts only as agent of the other lines. Here, the defendant
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holds itself out to the consignor as a common carrier for the
whole route, and in its own name, and for itself, as principal
and not as agent of any one, contracts to furnish the necessary
means of transportation upon every part of the entire journey.
The duty of transportation is divided into several parts, and
each company stands as an independent carrier, bound only
for safe carriage over its own line, and prompt delivery to
the next in succession, or to the consignees ; but it is released
from liability only while the goods may be in custody of
other lines. Here, the defendant undertakes the whole transportation upon its own responsibility ; and, owning no railroad itself for any part of the route, it employs such lines of
others as it sees fit to use. In making the contract with the
consignors, it acts for itself alone; and in making the necessary sub-contracts with such railroad lines as it chooses to employ for assistance in the performance of its undertaking with
the consignor, it again acts for itself, and no one else. And
though it thus assumes for itself the duty of through transportation, and selects its own agencies, it nevertheless attempts to exempt itself absolutely from all accountability for
any loss that may occur during any part of the entire transit.
There, the company first receiving the goods and making
the contract for itself and other companies, leaves each answerable, under the law, for any loss upon its own line, the
same as if no special contract were made; and stipulates only
for exemption from liability for loss upon other lines-a
liability which it could not in any event be compelled to assume against its will. Here, the defendant leaves itself
accountable for no loss whatever which may happen on any
part of the journey; but, by throwing the whole burden upon
the railroad lines, its agents, it seeks to relieve itself absolutely from even a possibility of responsibility, on its own
part, for any loss on any line. If loss be occasioned upon the
first line, or upon the last line, or upon any intermediate line,
the result is the same to the defendant; it has positive exemption from accountability in each and every instance, if its
stipulation be sustained. It assumes the duty and receives
the compensation of a common carrier, but tries to throw off
all responsibility attaching to that relation and character.
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There, the contract is reasonable, and therefore lawful; here,
it is unreasonable, and therefore unlawful.
Manifestly no one of several connecting lines of railroad
would be permitted to contract against accountability for a
loss upon its own line; and for the same obvious reasons this
defendant, which makes such lines its agents and its own for
the purposes of this transportation as between it and the
owner of the goods, should not be allowed to protect itself
behind the stipulation presented in this case; otherwise all
common carriers, in the law, which use the conveyances of
others in the transportation of their freight and performance
of their contracts with their customers, may, by agreement,
completely annihilate their common-carrier liability, and revolutionize zhe wholesome rule of law hitherto prevailing upon
that subject.
Owing to the vast scope and importance of the subject, the
Courts and text writers have devoted much time and space
to the discussion of the power and right of connecting railroad companies to limit and extend their common-law liability as common carriers within and beyond the termini of
their respective lines. All authorities are now agreed, we
believe, in holding that the first of a number of successive
companies rendering service in the carriage of freight between
distant points, may so bind itself to deliver goods beyond the
terminus of its own line, as to become responsible for their
safe carriage through the entire journey. But with respect
to what is necessary to constitute such a contract, the English
and American authorities are quite inharmonious. The English rule is that the receipt of goods marked for a given point
without a positive limitation of responsibility, affords prima
facie evidence of an undertaking on the part of the carrier to
safely transport them to their destination, whether within or
beyond the limits of its own line; while in America, most of
the Courts regard each company as liable in the common-carrier capacity, only for the extent of its own line, unless there
be a special contract to the contrary. The latter may be
stated to be the American rule, though some of the States,
Tennessee among the number, have adopted the English rule
as more consonant with sound reason and public policy:
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Schouler, Bailm. (ed. 1887) §§ 593-598, inclusive; Lawson,
Cont. §§ 235-240, inclusive; Redf. Carr. §§ 190-197; Hutch.
Carr. §§ 145-149, 151,152 ; Railroad Co. v. Campbell, 7 Heisk.
253; Railroad Co. v. Rogers, 6 Id. 143; Railroad Co. v. Me.Elwee, Id. 208; Railroad Co. v. Weaver, 9 Lea, 88. It is likewise well settled that a common carrier is not bound in law
to transport goods beyond its terminus, and that it may
therefore lawfully stipulate that it shall not be liable for loss
after the goods have passed beyond the limits of its own line
and upon the line of another: Schouler, Bailm. § 603; Lawson, Cont. § 236 ; Railroad Co. v. Brumley, 5 Lea, 401 ; -Dillard v. Railroad Co., 2 Id. 288; Railroad Co. v. .Holloway, 9
Baxt. 188; Railroad Co. v. Campbell, 7 Heisk. 257. But it is
readily seen that this case is not controlled by either of those
doctrines. It is not the case of a limitation of liability to the
line of the contracting carrier, nor of an extension of responsibility beyond the limits of that line; on the contrary, it is
the case of a carrier for the whole route, attempting to relieve
itself from liability upon any part thereof, because it has no
conveyance of its own, and is compelled to use those of others,
in the performance of its contract of shipment. Declining to
lend our assistance or approval to such an effort, we hold that
the defendant, notwithstanding its stipulation, is responsible
for the consequences of the negligence, if any, of the railroad
companies which it employed in the transportation of the
goods sued for, such companies being, to all intents and purposes, its servants or agents, as between it and the plaintiff.
There is no positive proof that the loss resulted from the
negligence of any one. But such proof is n t necessary to
entitle plaintiff to a recovery; for "when goods in the custody of a common carrier are lost or damaged, the presumption of law is that it was occasioned by his default, and the
burden is upon him to prove that it arose from a cause for
which he was not responsible :" Lawson, Cont. § 245 ; Hutch.
Carr. § 769-; Schouler, Bailm. § 439; Railroad Co. v. Holloway,
9 Baxt. 188 ; -Dillardv. Railroad Co., 2 Lea, 296 ; Transportation Co. v. Oil Co., 63 Pa. St. 14.
The defendant assigns as additional error, the action of the
Court below in giving to the jury certain instructions and in re-
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fusing certain requests for instructions with respect to what was
necessary to constitute the bill of lading, a contract between
the parties. Referring to the bill of lading and the stipulation therein, which we have already quoted and considered,
his Honor, the trial judge, said to the jury: "It is not a contract between the parties unless you find that there is evidence
establishing that plaintiffs agreed to that stipulation. Before
the stipulation in the bill of lading would be binding on the
plaintiffs, it would be necessary for the defendant to show
that plaintiffs' attention had been called to it, and that they
expressly or impliedly assented to it; the fact that they accepted the bill of lading from the defendant, kept possession
of it without objection, and introduced it in evidence, would
not be sufficient, in my opinion." This charge is in accord
with the uniform holding of the Supreme Court of Illinois,
which requires the carriers to show affirmatively that the
restrictions of liability claimed by it were in fact known and
assented to by the shippers: Boscowitz v. Express Co., 93 Ill.
523 ; -Fieldv. Railroad Co., 71 Id. 458 ; Express Co. v. Haynes,
42 Id. 89 ; but it is contrary to the great weight of American
and English decisions, which hold that the fair and honest
acceptance of a bill of lading without dissent raises a presumption that all limitations contained therein were brought
to the knowledge of the shipper, and agreed to by him: 3
Woods, Ry. Law, note 2, pp. 1577,1578; Lawson, Cont. § 102;
Hutch. Carr. § 239; Schouler, Bailm. §§ 464, 465 ; Railroad
v. Brumley, 5 Lea, 404; Dillard v. Railroad Co., 2 Id. 294.
The requests for instructions were in substantial conformity
to the rule as announced by this Court in the last two cases
mentioned. This action of the Court in giving the jury improper instruction upon the one hand and in refusing to give
proper instruction upon the other, would ordinarily be fatal,
and afford ground for reversal; but it is not so in this case,
because the error is immaterial. The matter in hand was the
stipulation through which the defendant sought to protect
itself against liability. It has already been seen that the
Court was right in telling the jury that such stipulation,
though contained in the contract, was invalid, because unreasonable and against public policy. Therefore any error with
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reference to what was necessary to make it a contract, was
clearly immaterial. Being immaterial, a reversal cannot be
predicated upon it: Myers v. Bank, 3 Head, 331; .Redmond
v. Bowles, 5 Sneed, 547; Patterson v. Head, 1 Lea, 664.
Affirmed.
FoIKus, J., dissented.
The Power of Express Companies to
Limit their Liability as Common Car-

itself from liability for loss or damage
resulting from the negligence of the
ries.
common carriers, which it engages to
The defendant in the principal case, effect the transportation of goods
the Merchants' Despatch Transporta- which it has undertaken to carry, or
tion Company, is practically a freight
resulting from the negligence of the
express company. Like an express servants of such common carriers.
company, it is an independent organThis proposition of law must be
ization, owning its own cars, and taken as conclusively established by
contracting, on the one hand, with the authorities: Bank of Kentucky v.
individuals to carry their property, Adams Express Co., 93 U. S. 174;
and, on the other hand, with various
Christenson v. American Express Co.,
common carriers for the transportation 15 Minn. 270; Boscowitz v. Adams Exof the property it has so undertaken press Co., 93 Ill. 523; Muser v. Amerito carry: Hadley, R. R. Transporta- can Express Co., U. S. Circ. Ct. S.
tion, p. 80. Most fast-freight lines Dist. N. Y. Jan. 24, 1880, 1 Fed. R.
are merely an association or partner- 382; Cincinnati, etc. R. R. Co. v.
ship of connecting carriers for the Pontius, 19 Ohio St. 221; Galveston,
carriage of through freight, and have etc. R. R. Co. v. Allison, 12 Am. &
no real existence apart from the car- Eng. R. R. Cas. 28. Inasmuch, howriers of which the association is com- ever, as it was not established without
dissent, and as the basis upon which
posed: Hadley, R. R. Transportation,
pp. 88 and -89; Block v. Despatch it rests is not altogether clear, it has
Co., 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. been thought desirable to examine
1. The Merchants' Despatch Trans- the authorities upon the point in
chronological order, with the view of
portation Company is an exception.
As above stated it has a separate, in- arriving at a satisfactory explanation
dependent existence, distinct from of the present state of the law.
The first case on the subject is
that of the common carriers doing its
transportation, and differs from an Hooper v. Wells, Fargo 4- Co., 27 Cal.
express company chiefly in the nature 11; s. c. 5 AERICAN LAw REGISTER,
N. S. 16. In that case, the defendant,
and amount of freight it transports.
an express company, engaged to carry
For the purpose of this note, then,
the decision in the principal case may for the plaintiff, a package of gold dust
be treated precisely as if the defend- worth $10,755, from Los Angeles to San
ant had been an express company. Francisco, stipulating not to be liable
The case may be regarded as an except as forwarders, nor for loss or
authority that an express company damage arising from railroad, ocean,
cannot by special contract so limit its or river navigation, etc. While the
common carrier liability as to exempt package was being conveyed in the
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care of the defendants' messenger on
a tugboat, on which it was to be carried to the steamer for San Francisco,
the boiler of the tug exploded, owing
to the carelessness of the engineer.
The messenger was killed and the
gold dust lost. The defendants did
not own or control the tugboat. The
Court held that the clause providing
that the defendants should be liable
only as forwarders, did not make the
defendants forwarders, but merely
fixed the degree or extent of the
liability which they intended to assume. That the defendants were
common carriers with a liability the
same as that of a mere forwarder of
goods. But forwarders of goods are
liable for losses resulting from the
negligence of their servants or agents.
The engineer of the tug was the agent
or servant of the defendants, and,
therefore, the clause in question
did not exonerate the defendants from
the loss, since it was caused by the
"negligence of the engineer" in permitting or causing the boiler to explode. This case was annotated by
Judge REDFIELD, 5 AMERICA- LAW
He says: "The
REGISTER, N. S. 30.
proposition that such a restrictive
clause, to the extent that the express company are only to be recould
sponsible as 'forwarders,'
not be construed as exempting the
carrier from responsibility for loss
caused by the negligence of the
employds on a steamboat, owned and
controlled by other parties than the
carrier, but ordinally used by him in
his business of carrier as a means of
transportation; and that in such case
the employ~s of the steamboat are,
in legal contemplation, the servants
of the carrier, seems not susceptible
Nevertheless,
of much question."
the case of Hooper v. Wells, Fargo t"
Co. was shortly after vehemently
attacked in a leading article in the
VOL. XXXVI.-74
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LAW REGISTER (5 AMERIcA, LAW REG;ef point
ISTER, 449 and 513), the
of attack being the assumption on the
part of the Court that the engineer of
the tugboat was the defendants' servant or agent. The writer denied
that the engineer was in any sense
the servant or agent of the express
company. He says that it might with
equal propriety be urged that the
driver of an omnibus, who runs over
a child, is the servant of a passenger
riding inside. The defendants expressly stipulated that their liability
should be only that of a forwarder.
Now a forwarder is only responsible
for care in selecting suitable conveyances, and that, therefore, the defendants' responsibility, as far as the
transportation by tugboat was concerned, was limited to selecting a
suitable tugboat (and there was no
evidence to show that the tugboat in
question was not suitable), and that
the defendants were entirely exempted
from all liability for the negligence
of the officers in operating the tug.
The writer lays down the general proposition, that express companies may
exempt themselves from liability for
the negligence of employ~s of railroads and steamboats, which they
hire to do their carrying for them, on
the ground that such employ~s are
not the employ~s of the express companies, and that, hence, the rule prohibiting a carrier from contracting
for exemption from the consequences
of the negligence of his employ6s,
He defends this
does not apply.
proposition on the ground that the
express carriers do not and cannot
control the employ6s of the railroads
or steamboats.
Another writer (5 AMRRIcAx LAW
REGISTER, N. S. 648) goes so far as to
hint that express companies are not
common carriers, and should be exempted from liability for the negli-
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gence of the employ6s of carriers
they employ, without any special
contract limiting liability, on the
general principles of law, that a person is not liable for the negligence
of the servant of one who contracts
to do work for him.
The next case is that of Christenson
v. American Express Co., 15 Minn.
270. IA that ease, the plaintiff delivered two chests of tea to the defendants at New York City, which it
contracted to carry to Mankato, Minn.,
stipulating that it should be liable
only as forwarders, and not liable for
the perils of transportation or navigation. While the goods were en
route, in charge of one of the defendants' messengers, the steamboat on
which they were being transported
struck a snag, owing to the negligence
of those in charge of the boat. The
boat was sunk and the goods lost.
The defendants neither owned nor
controlled the boat. The Court held
that though the defendants' common
law liability was modified by the
special stipulation, it was not modified
far enough to exempt the defendant
from responsibility for its own negligence or that of its agents employed
by it in the transmission of the goods,
and that, the defendants were therefore liable for the loss of the goods,
thereby assuming that the officers of
the boat were the agents of the express company.
The next and leading case upon the
subject is that of Bank of Kentucky v.
Adams Express Co., 93 U. S. 174. In
that case, the defendant, the Adams
Express Company, received a package
of money from the Louisiana National
Bank, New Orleans, to be transported
to the Bank of Kentucky, Louisville,
Ky. The defendant itself owned or
controlled no means of transportation,
but hired common carriers to do its
transportation for it.
While the

package of money in question was
being carried over the road of the
Louisville and Nashville Company,
the car was thrown from the track by
the breaking of a trestle, caught fire,
and the package of money was destroyed. The money was in possession
of the messenger of the defendant at
the time the accident took place. He
was rendered insensible by the fall
of the car, and so continued until after
the money was destroyed. The bill
of lading contained a clause stipulating that "the company are not to be
liable in any manner or to any extent
for any loss, damage, or detention of
such package or its contents, or of
any portion thereof, occasioned by
fire." The Court below charged the
jury that under the above clause, the
defendants would not be liable for the
loss if resulting solely from the negligence of the railroad company or its
servants, the defendants and its messenger being free from negligence.
On appeal the Supreme Court held
that this instruction was erroneous;
that the clause in question did not
provide an exemption broad enough
to relieve the express company from
loss arising through the negligence
of the railroad companies or their
employs ; that the clause should
not be construed as covering the case,
losses by fire, caused by the negligence
of the railroads or their servants.
The Court also intimates that an express company cannot by special
contract exonerate itself from liability
in such cases. The Court thus deals
with the objection that the servant of
the railroad is not that of the express
company, and that, therefore, the
rule prohibiting common carriers from
stipulating against liability for the
negligence of their employds does
not govern. "The foundation of the
rule is, that it tends to the greater
security of consignors, who always
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deal with such carriers at a disadvantage.
It tends to produce
greater care and watchfulness in those
to whom an owner intrusts his goods,
and by whom alone the needful care
can be exercised. Any contract that
withdraws a motive for such care, or
that makes a failure to bestow upon
the duty assumed extreme vigilance
and caution more probable, takes
away the security of the consignors,
and makes common carriers more unreliable.
This is equally true,
whether the contract be for exemption
from liability for the negligence of
agencies employed by the carrier to
assist him in the discharge of his obligations, though he has no control
over them, or whether it be for exemption from liability for a loss occasioned by the carelessness of his
immediate servant."
In Joscowitz v. Adams Express Co.,
93 111. 523 (1879), the facts were as
follows: The plaintiff had expressed
goods by the defendant company.
The defendant had given them to a
railroad company to transport and
while in transit they were destroyed
by fire in an accident which occurred.
In the receipt given by the defendant
was a printed clause exempting the
company from liability to exceed $50.
On the trial, evidence was offered,
going to show that the fire by which
the goods were destroyed was caused
by telescoping of the cars, and that
the telescoping might have been prevented, had the company had upon
their cars a proper kind of platform.
All this evidence was excluded. On
appeal, it was held that the defendant
was liable for the full value of the
goods, if their loss was caused by the
negligence of the railroad company,
and that, therefore, the evidence excluded should have been admitted, as
tending to show negligence on the part
of the railroad company.
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In Afuser v. American Express Company, supra (1880), it was held that an
express company could not, by special
contract or stipulation in the express
receipt, exonerate itself from liability
for the destruction of the property
caused by the negligence of the employds of a railroad company employed by the express company to
transport the property.
The following authorities, although
the carrier was not an express company, bear upon the subject under
discussion :In the case of Cincinnati,etc. 1. R. Co.
v. P ntius, 19 Ohio St. 221, the Court
state that where a common carrier
makes an entire contract for the transportation of goods to a point beyond
its own line, it cannot, by special
contract, exempt itself from liability
for loss or damage occasioned by the
negligence of the connecting carrier
or its servants or employ~s. In this
case, the terminus of the defendants'
road was Dayton: the goods were to
be shipped to New York. The Court
say: " It is quite clear, therefore,
that if the company had made a contract to carry to Dayton only, and a
similar proviso had been inserted
against liability for loss happening on
the company's own road, the proviso
would have been void, at least as to
any loss occasioned by negligence or
default. Now, if the contract is to be
regarded as an undertaking to carry
to New York instead of Dayton, why
should not the same rule of law apply ?
The same reasons of public policy
seem to exist. The only essential
differenoe is that in the latter case the
distance covered by the undertaking
is increased, and the number of the
arrier's agents is multiplied. * * *
The same rule of public policy, which
denies the right of exemption from
loss, arising from fault or negligence,
and the same reasons supporting it,
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apply equally to such cases as it does
to contracts for carriage upon the
carrier's own road:" Galveston, etc.
B. R., Co. v. Allison, 12 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 28.
In Mfachu v. Railway Co., 2 Exch.
415, the facts were as follows: It was
provided by Act of Parliament that
common carriers should not be liable
for the l6ss of parcels, unless their
value were disclosed and an insurance
price paid; it was provided, in the
Act, however, "that nothing in this
Act shall be deemed to protect any
mail contractor, stage-coach proprietor,
or other common carrier for hire, from
liability to answer for loss or injury
to any goods or articles whatsoever,
arising from the felonious acts of any
coachman, guard, book-keeper, porter,
or other servant in his or their emThe plaintiff delivered a
ploy."
parcel to the defendant railroad company to be carried to Bunhill-road,
The railroad contracted
London.
with Chaplin & Home to carry goods
for it in London. The plaintiff's parcel was stolen by Johnson, a porter
employed by Chaplin & Home, who
had been intrusted with the goods,
to convey them to the place to which
Although
they were addressed.
Chaplin & Home were independent
contractors and Johnson was their
servant and not that of the road, it
was held that Johnson was a servant
in the employ of the defendant, within
the meaning of the Act, he being a
servant engaged in doing, in behalf of
the company, the work of transportation it had undertaken. The Court
say that the Act is to be construed
very liberally, and their construction
of it would indeed appear to be liberal.
PoLLocK,. C. B., says: "I am of
opinion that this liability cannot be
disposed of by the introduction of the
term 'agent,' or by giving a principal name to the employment of any

one -employed to discharge the duty
undertaken by the carrier. In the
case which was put in the course of
the argument, where a carrier confines
himself to receiving goods and making
contracts for their carriage and avails
himself of a sub-contract to transfer
to some one else the whole duty which
he has undertaken to perform, I think
that all the parties who come in under
that subsequent contract, whether
directly or by sub-contract, I think
that all the parties actually employed
in doing the work which the carrier
undertook to do, either by himself or
by his servants, are his servants
within the meaning of the eighth sea-.
tion of the Act in question."
RoaFE, B., says, construing the part
of the Act given above in quotation
marks: "I think a very large construction ought to be given to these
words; they must be taken to mean
the book-keepers, porters, or other
servants actually employed to do what
the carrier has undertaken to do."
PLATT, B., says: "Any person em-

ployed by a carrier to perform the
contract into which he enters, is a
servant in the employ of the carrier,
within the true meaning of the
statute."
We have now examined all the
authorities (so far as the writer
knows) upon the subject under discussion. Several distinctions are to
be noted. First, although it is generally stated in all of these authorities
that the express company is responsible for the negligence of the servants
of railroads or other carriers it employs, this point is actually involved.
in only three of them: Hooper v.
Wells, Fargo 4- Co., Christenson v. Express Co., and Muser v. Express Company. In Bank of Kentucky v. Adams
Express Co., and Boscowitz v. Express
Co., the negligence was not on the
part of servants or employ6s of the
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road, but of the road itself; in the one
case, in having an insufficient bridge,
in the other, in not having proper
platforms to its cars. The distinction
is important, and for this reason. The
railroads are undoubtedly to be regarded as agents of the express company in transporting property for it.
Hence, in all jurisdictions where the
rule prevails that a common carrier
can not stipulate against the consequences of the negligence of his own
servants or agents, the strict and
literal terms of the rule would prevent an express company from exempting itself by stipulation from
loss through the negligence of the
railroads it contracts with. Not so,
however, where the express company
seeks to exempt itself from loss arising from the negligence of the employs or servants of the railroad.
Here the servants or employds are
those of the road, and not those of the
express company, and hence the case
does not fall within the strict provisions of the rule.
Another distinction to be observed
is this. Some of the cases hold that
express companies cannot exempt
themselves from the consequences of
the negligence of the railroads or their
employ~s, while other cases merely
hold that the given stipulation passed
upon in the case was not strong
enough to provide such exemption.
All the cases which base the liability
of the express company for negligence
of employ~s of the railroad it employs
upon the general rule that a common
carrier cannot exempt himself by
special contract, from liability for the
negligence of his servants or agents,
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maintain that the servant of the railroad is also in some sense that of the
express company as well. The criticism of this position in the leading
article in Tax LAw REGisTR seems
entirely just. The servant of the
railroad is not, in any sense, the servant of the express company, and
the refusal to permit the express
company to exempt itself from the
consequences of his negligence, cannot reasonably be based on any
assumption that he is.
Is not the true explaiation this ?
That the same principle of public
policy which prohibits a common
carrier from stipulating for exemption
from liability from loss or damage,
arising in the carriage of goods, from
the negligence of his servants or
agents, demands that that rule should
be extended, in the case of express
carriers, so as to prohibit them from
stipulating against the consequences
of the negligence, not only of their
own servants or agents, but of those
of the railroad which they employ.
This explanation is hinted at in the
extract from the opinion of the Court
in Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Express
Company, quoted above. It is true,
that the language of the judge in the
English case of Machu v. R. Co. is
rather against this explanation: But
it seems that the Court there gave an
unnatural and forced construction to
a statute, to make it fit circumstances
and conditions that had grown up since
its enactment. With us, the question
is not one of construing a statute,
but of applying principles of law.
Louis M. GRELEY.
Chicago, Ill.

SEELEY r. WELLES.

Supreme Court qf Pennsylvania.
SEELEY v. WELLES.
Where a person agrees to take a machine and try it, and, if it works to
suit him, to buy it, he may reject it, though his objections may seem unreasonable to others, if his objection is made in good faith and is not merely
capricious.

Common Pleas of Bradford County.
Louis ,M. Hall and I 3ePherson (William T. Davies with
them), for plaintiff in error.
John N. Califf and -H.
X. Williams (Elsbree & Willianis with
ERROR to

them), for defendant in error.
CLARK, J. This suit was brought to recover the first in-

stalment on an alleged contract for the sale of an Osborne
reaper and binder. The principal controversy arises out of a
disagreement as to the nature and terms of the contract. The
plaintiff, on the one hand, alleges that the sale was absolute;
that the machine was to be set up and tried, and was to work
well, that it was put upon trial, and was accepted by Seeley;
that the terms of the contract were fixed, and the time and
manner of payment fully agreed upon. The defendant, on the
other hand, maintains that he was to try the machine, and if
it worked to suit him, and he could use it satisfactorily on
his land, of which he was to be the judge, he was to take it
upon the terms agreed upon; that upon trial it was not satisfactory, and he returned it to *elles.
Both parties were to
some extent corroborated by other witnesses, but the testimony was contradictory and conflictinr; and it was for the
jury to determine the true state of the facts.
In the general charge the learned judge of the Court below
instructed the jury as follows: "If you believe the evidence
on the part of the plaintiff, particularly of Espy and Bradley,
as to what occurred at the hammock, then there was a complete contract, and the plaintiff would be entitled to recover.
If, on the other hand, you believe the evidence on the part of
the defendant, that he was to take the machine and try it,
and that he was not to keep it unless it worked to his satisfaction, then the plaintiff cannot recover, provided you find that
the machine did notwork well, and that he had reasonable cause
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to be dissatisfied with it. But if the machine did good work,
he could not say, 'I have made a bad bargain; I am not satisfied,' and return the machine. In other words, there must
have been a reasonable cause for his dissatisfaction, and the
returning of the machine must have been in good faith.

*

*

*

There is a great disagreement in the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiff and the defendant, upon this subject,
and you will have to determine, from all this evidence,
whether the working of the machine was such as to give Mr.
Seeley reasonable cause to be dissatisfied with it, or whether
it worked well, according to the agreement and warranty, as
testified to by the plaintiff and his witnesses. You will now
take this case and give it your careful consideration, and render such a verdict as will do justice between the parties."
In this instruction of the Court to the jury, we think there
was error. If the defendant's theory of the case, on the facts,
is accepted, it is plain that although the reaper may have
worked well in the opinion of those who saw it, yet, if it did not
work to the satisfaction of the defendant, he was not obliged
to take it; he testifies that he told Espy he would not take the
reaper until he tried it, and if it worked to suit him, and his
team could handle it on his farm, he would buy it, and that he
was to be the judge of this himself. lie complains that it
was too heavy ; that it weighed nearly 200 pounds more than
it had been represented to weigh; that his horses could
not haul it; and that, in his judgment, it did not do the work
well, etc. His objections to the reaper may have been ill
founded; indeed, they may have been in some sense unreasonable, in the opinion of others; yet if they were made in
good faith, he bad a right, if his testimony is believed, to reject it. It he wanted a machine that was satisfactory to
himself, not to other people, and contracted in this form, upon
what principle shall he be bound to accept one that he expressly disapproved ?
What the learned Court said to the jury on this point was
equivalent to saying that although the reaper may have been
wholly unsatisfactory to the defendant, yet if the jury
thought he ought to have been satisfied, he was bound to
take it; whereas, if the defendant's testimony is true, he was
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to judge of the merits of the machine himself, not the bystanders, nor tne jury ; and if he exercised his own judgment,
in good faith, in the refusal to accept it, he was certainly not
bound for the price.
The case is ruled by Singerly v. T77ayer, 108 Pa. St. 291,where
the authorities are collected, and the legal principles involved
fully discussed. What has been said is of course applicable
to the case only in the event that the jury in the re-trial of
this case' shall accept the defendant's theory as the correct one;
for, if the evidence on the part of the plaintiff is believed, the
contract was complete. Upon this question, as we have said,
the testimony is conflicting. We have purposely refrained
from any discussion of the facts, out of which the principles
of law governing the case arise, fearing that any reference to
the testimony, in detail, might have a misleading effect. It is
of the highest importance, in such a case as this, that the jury
should be left entirely free to consider and determine the facts
upon their own judgment.
The judgment is reversed, and a venire facias de novo
awarded.
he is not bound to accept it. Such a
contract may be unwise, but of its
Where a person undertakes to
wisdom the party so contracting is to
manufacture an article or deliver
be judge ; and if he deliberately enters
goods which he guarantees shall be into such an agreement, he must
satisfactory to the buyer, the pur- abide by it. To this effect, Iallidic
chaser is sole judge whether the v. Sutter St. R. R. Co., 63 Cal. 575 ;
article is satisfactory, and there is no
Zaleski v. Clark, 44 Conn. 218; s. c.
remedy left for the seller, where the
26 Am. Rep. 446 ; Brown v. Foster,
purchaser is not satisfied: McClure 113 Mass. 136; s. c. 18 Am. Rep.
v. Briggs, 58 Vt. 82.
463; McCarren v. McVulty, 73 Mass.
In the case of Silsby Mamif. Co. v.
(7 Gray) 139; Gibson v. Cranage, 39
Chicago, 24 Fed. Rep. 893, the Circuit
Mlich. 49; Mond Reaping Mlacdine Co.
Court of the United States (Dist. Cal.
v. Smith, 50 Id. 565; Heron v. Davis,
Sept. 7, 1885) says: "The author3 Bosw. (N. Y.) 336; Hoffman v.
ities are abundant to the effect that
Gallaher, 6 Daly (N. Y.) 42; Gray
upon a contract containing a provision
v. Central R. R. Co., 11 Hun (N. Y.),
that an article to be made and de70.
livered shall be satisfactory to the
Thus, where one undertakes, "to
purchaser it must be satisfactory to
satisfaction," to make a suit of
him, or he is not required to take it.
clothes, Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass.
It is not enough to be satisfied with
136; s. c. 18 Am. Rep. 463; to fill a
the article ; he must be satisfied, or
particular place as agent, Tyler v.
CONTRACT TO FURNISH ARTICLES "TO
SATISFACTION."
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Ames, 6 Lans. (N. Y.) 280; to moui
a bust, Zalcski v. Claik, 44 Conn.
21 ; s. c. 26 Aim. Rep. 446; or paint a
portrait, Gibson v. 0ranaye, 39 Mich.
49 ; Hld1hnan v. Gallaher, 6 Daly (N.
Y.) 42; Moore v. Goodin, 43 Hun
(N. Y.), 534; he maynot unreasonably
expect to be bound by the opinion of
his emplover, honestly entertained;
and neither the opposite party nor
the jury can decide that he ought to
be satisfied with the article made :
loorc v. Goodwin, 43 Hun (N. Y.),
534. See Mood Reaping and 3Mowing
MIaddne Co. v. Smith, 50 Mich. 565.
Thus, it has been held, that a contract to erect a patent hydraulic hoist,
"warranted satisfactory in every respect," constitutes the purchaser sole
judge of its fitness, and does not
mean that it should be such as would
satisfy other persons, or that the
promisee reasonably ought to be satisfied with it: Singerly v. Thayer, 108
Pa. St. 291. And where the contract
under which work is done provides
for approval by a third party, no
right to money earned or cause of
action accrues until that party's
certificate is procured : Kirkland v.
Moore, 40 N. J. Eq. 106; Tetz v.
Buttjfield, 54 Wis. 242; Oakwood
Retreat Association v. RatAbone, 65
Id. 177. But where the purchaser
is in fact satisfied, but fraudulently
and in bad faith declares that he is
not satisfied, the contract has been
fully performed by the vendor, and
the purchaser is bound to accept the
article : Silsby Mannf. Co. v. Chicago,
24 Fed. Rep. 893, supra. Thus it was
held in Lynn v. Baltimnore 6- 0. R. R.
Co., 60 Md. 404; s. c. 45 Am. Rep.
641, that on a contract by a corporation to purchase certain goods subject
to inspection and approval by its
agent, the corporation is liable if the
agent fraudulently or in bad faith disapproves of the goods.
VOL. XXXVI.-75

In Connecticut, in the case of Zaleski
v. Clark, 44 Conn. 418; s. v. 26 Ain.
Rep. 446, where a sculptor undertook
to furnish a bust to the satisfaction
of the defendant, who refused to accept the work, when done, thouglh in
fact a fine piece of workmanship, the
Supreme Court held that there could
be no recovery. The Court say : "A
contract to produce a bust perfect in
every respect, and one with which the
defendant ought to be satisfied, is one
thing: and undertaking to make one
with which she will be satisfied is
quite another thing. The latter can
only be determined by the defendant
herself. It may have been unwise in
the plaintiff to make, such a contract,
but having made it he is bound by
it." See, also, Gibson v. Cranage,
39 Mich. 49 ; Gray v. Central R. R.
Co. of N. J., 11 Hun (N. Y.), 70.
The case of Zaleski v. Clark, supra,
is founded upon Brown v. Foster, 113
Mass. 136; s. c. 18 Am. Rep. 463;
iMlcCarren v. 3McNulty, 73 Mass. (7
Gray) 139.
In 3lassachusetts, in a case where
the plaintiff undertook to make a
bookcase for a society, which was to
be "to the satisfaction" of the president, the Court say: "It may be that
the plaintiff was injudicious or indiscreet in undertaking to labor and
furnish materials for a compensation,
the payment of which was made dependent upon a contingency so hazardous or doubtful as thesatisfaction ofa
party particularly in interest. But
of that he was the sole judge. Against
the consequences resulting from his
own bargain the law can afford him
no relief:" McCarren v. 11ciulty, 73
Blass. (7 Gray) 139. And this case
was subsequently followed in Brown
v. bster, 113 Mass. 139 ; s. c. 18 Am.
ReD. 463, where the court say: "Although the compensation of the plaintiff for valuable service and materials
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may thus be dependent upon the cases of this class are generally such
caprice of another who unreasonably as involve the feelings, taste, or sensirefuses to accept the articles manu- bility of the promisor, and not those
factured, yet he cannot be relieved gross considerations of operative fitfrom the contract into which he has ness or mechanical utility which are
voluntarily entered."
capable of being seen and appreciated
In Michigan, in the case of Wood by others. But this is not always so.
Reaping and Mowing Machine Co. v. It sometimes happens that the right is
Smith, 50 Mich. 555, which was a suit
fully reserved where it is the chief
for the contract price of a machine ground, if not the only one, that the
warranted to be satisfactory to the party is determined to preserve an
defendant, it was held that "a stipu- unqualified option and is not willing
lation in a contract of sale that it shall
to leave his freedom of choice exposed
be of no effect unless the goods are to any contention, or subject to any
satisfactory, is to be construed, accordcontingency. He is resolved to pering to the circumstances, as reserving mit no right in any one else to judge
to the promisor the absolute right to for him, or to pass on the wisdom or
reject them without giving any reason,
unwisdom, the justice or injustice,
or as binding him to decide on fair of his action. Such is his will. He
and reasonable grounds. In one case,
will not enter into any bargain upon
the condition of reserving the power
his conclusion cannot be reviewed,
but it can be in the other." The to do what others might regard as
Court say that "the cases where the reasonable. The following cases sufficiently illustrate the instances of
parties provide that the promisor is
to be satisfied, or to that effect, are of
the first class : Zalesk-i v. Clark, 44
Conn. 218; s. c. 26 Am. Rep. 446 ;
two classes; and whether the particular case at any time falls within the Brown v. Foster,113 Mass. 136; s. c.18
one or the other must depend on the Am. Rep. 463; McCarren v. 1lcNulty,
73 Mass. (7 Gray) 139 ; Gibson v. Cranspecial circumstances, and the question must be one of construction. In
age, 39 Mich. 49 ; Hart v. Hart, 22
the one class, the right of decision is Barb. (N. Y.) 606 ; Tyler v.Ames, 6
completely reserved to the promisor,
Lans. (N. Y.) 280 ; Rossiter v. Cooper,
and without being liable to disclose
23 Vt. 522 ; Taylor v. Brewer, 1 Maule
reasons or account for his course; and
& Sel. 290.
In the other class the
all right to inquire into the grounds promisor is supposed to undertake
of his action and overhaul its deter- that he will act reasonably and fairly,
mination is absolutely excluded from
and found his determination on
all tribunals. It is sufficient for the grounds which are just and sensible;
result that he willed it. The law re- and from thence springs a necessary
gards the parties as competent to con- implication that his decision, in point
tract in that manner, and if the facts of correctness, and the adequacy of
are sufficient to show that they did the grounds of it, are open consideraso, their stipulation is the law of the tions, and subject to the judgment of
case. The promisee is excluded from
judicial triers."
setting up any claim for remuneration,
Among the cases applying to this
and is likewise debarred from ques- class are, Daggett r. Johnson, 49 Vt.
tioning the grounds of decision on the 345, and Hartfbrd Manufacturing Co.
part of the promisor, or the fitness or v. Brush, 43 Vt. 528.
propriety of the decision itself. The
In New York, where the plaintiff
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repaired and set up the boilers for
the defendant, under the contract
that lie was not to be paid, until the
defendants were satisfied that the
"boiler as changed was a success,"
defendants claimed that they alone
were to determine the question whether
they were satisfied that the boiler as
changed was a success. The Court
held that this was error, where the
work was completed according to contract, and the defendants used it
without objection or comllaint. The
time for payment had come and the
plaintiff had a right of action for the
contract price in case payment was
refused. The reason upon which this
was founded seems to be, "that
which the law will say a contracting
party ought in reason to be satisfied
with, that the law will say he is satisfied with :" Duplex Safety Boiler Co.
v. Garden, 101 N. Y. 387; s. c. 54
Am. Rep. 709. In Folliardv. Wallace,
2 Johns. (N. Y.) 395, W. covenanted
that, in case the title to a lot of land
conveyed to him by F. should prove
good and sufficient in law against all
other claims, he would pay to F. $150
three months after he should be "well
satisfied" that the title was undisputed. Upon suit brought, the defendant set up that he was "not
satisfied," and the plea was held bad,
the Court saying: "A simple allegation of dissatisfaction, without some
good reason assigned for it, might be a
mere pretext, and cannot be regarded."
This decision was followed in Aliesell
v. Globe M. L. Ins. Co., 76 N.Y. 115,
and Brooklyn v. Brooklyn R. R. Co.,
47 Id. 475.
In Pennsylvania, it was held, in the
recent case of Singerly v. Thayer, 108
Pa. St. 291, that a contract to furnish
an article which shall be satisfactory
to the purchaser, is not complied with
by proof that the article furnished is
made in a workmanlike manner, and

performs its intended purpose in a
manner which ought to ho satisfactory
to the purchaser. The contract in
this case was to erect an elevator
"satisfactory in every respect," and
the Court held the meaning of the
language used to be that the elevator,
when erected, should prove satisfactory to the person for whom it was
erected. As a matter of fact the elevator did not prove satisfactory, and
suit was brought on the contract for
the price. The Court say: "When
the agreement is to make and furnish
an article to the satisfaction of the
person for whom it is to be made,
numerous authorities declare it is not
a compliance with the contract to
prove that he ought to have been
satisfied. It was so where the contract was for the purchase of a steamboat :" Gray v. Central R. R. Co. of
N. J., 11 Hun (N. Y.), 70; where the
agreement was to make a suit of
clothes: Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass.
136; s. c. 18 Am. Rep. 463; on a
contract for a plaster bust of the deceased husband of the defendant:
Zaleski v. Clark, 44 Conn. 218; s. c.
26 Am. Rep. 446, where a portrait
was to be satisfactory to the defendant: Gibson v. Kranage, 39 Mich.
42; and where a portrait of defendant
was to be satisfactory to his friends :
Hoffman v. Gallaher, 6 Daly (N. Y.),
42.
In Vermont, in the case of McClure
v. Briggs, 58 Vt. 82, where A. set up
an organ in B.'s house, upon an agreement that B. should keep it and pay
for it, if it proved satisfactory to him,
B. thought without cause, that he was
dissatisfied, and notified A.
The
Court held that, provided he acted in
good faith, he was the sole judge as
to his satisfaction with the organ.
The Court say: "He was bound to
act honestly, and to give the instrument a fair trial, and such as the
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seller had a right, under the circumstances, to expect he would give it,
and herein to exercise such judgment
and capacity as he had, for, by the
contract, he was the one to be satisfied. and not another for him. If he
did this, and was still dissatisfied, and
that dissatisfaction was real and not
feigned, honest and not pretended, it
is enough, and plaintiffs have not
fulfilled their contract, and all these
elements are gatherable from the report. This is the doctrine of Daggett
v. Johnson, 49 Vt. 345, and of Hartford fanufacturing Co. v. Brush, 43
Id. 528. In the former case, the defendant was required to bring to the
trial of the evaporator only honesty
of purpose and judgment according to
his capacity, to ascertain his own
wishes, and was not required to exercise even ordinary skill and judgment
in making his determination. The
case turned on an error in the admission of testimony, but Judge REDFIELD
goes on to discuss the merits of the
case, somewhat following substantially in the line of Brush's case, and
citing it as authority. But Daggett
v. (Johnson is distinguishable in its
facts from Brush's case and from this
case in that the defendant omitted to
test the pans in the very respect in
which he knew it was claimed their
excellence consisted."
In WITsconsin, in the case of Tetz v.
Butterfield, 54 Wis. 242, it is said,
that where a building contract provides for the acceptance of the architect, evidence is admissible to show
that he acted collusively and in bad
faith. And in Glasius v. Black, 50

N. Y. 145, where by the terms of a
contract for repairing a building it
was provided that the materials to be
furnished should be of the best quality
and the workmanship performed in
the best manner, subject to the acceptance or rejection of the architect, and
all to be in strict accordance with the
plans and specifications, the work to
be paid for "when completely done
and accepted," it was held that the
acceptance by the architect did not
relieve the contractors from their
agreement to perform the work according to the plans and specifications;
nor did his acceptance of a different
class of work, or inferior materials,
from those contracted for, bind the
owner to pay for them; that the provision for acceptance was merely an
additional safeguard against defects
not discernible by an unskilled person. And in the recent case of Oakwood Retreat Association v. Rathbone,
65 Wis. 177, it was held that when a
contract provides for the performance
of work at a stipulated price, to the
satisfaction of an architect named
"therein, who is employed to adjust
all claims of the parties to the agreement, and a bond is given to secure a
faithful performance of the contract,
where the party agreeing to do the
work does not fully perform such contract, the other party may sue the
principal and sureties on the bond for
a breach of the contract, before the
architect has adjusted any claim arising out of the breach.
Rochester, N. Y.

JAMES M.

KERR.
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Suprenze Couirt of Wisconsin.
RAWSON MANUFACTURING CO. v. RICHARDS.
An attachment is properly granted and is a justification in the hands of
the sheriff, even if the complaint alleges a cause of action ex delicto and the
evidence tended to prove a tortious conversion; in such cases, it is always
competent to waive the tort and sue on the contract.
A written contract for the sale of personal property, stipulating that the
title to the property is to remain in the vendor until the purchase-money is
paid, is only valid in Wisconsin between the parties to the contract and
those having actual notice of it, unless the contract, or a copy thereof, is filed
in the office of the clerk of the town, city, or village where the vendee resides,
as required by Rev. Stat. § 2317.
Notice to a creditor, of the terms of such a contract, is sufficient notice to
bind the sheriff in executing an attachment upon property of the defendant,
and a seizure would be wrongful.

APPEAL from Circuit Court, Grant County.
The defendant was, during the times heren mentioned,
sheriff of Grant County. August 26, 1886, there was placed
in his bands, as such sheriff, a summons, complaint, and attachment papers, in an action wherein the Milwaukee Harvester
Company was plaintiff, and one Thomas L. Lomas, of Fennimore, Grant County, was defendant, with direction to serve and
execute the same, and which he did then and there serve and
execute; that in doing so he attached a large number of agricultural implements as the property of said Lomas; that the
complaint in said attachment suit alleged, in effect, the incorporation of the Milwaukee Harvester Company, aforesaid; a
contract between it and Lomas, under which it furnished
Lomas certain agricultural implementa and extras, described,
at prices named, during the summer of 1886, to the amount
of $4310.95, to be sold by him for it, and all the moneys and
notes received therefor, thereupon to be remitted and turned
over to it; that Lomas had sold all of such machines and
extras, and received therefor cash and notes; that Lomas had
not paid the Milwaukee Harvester Company for any portion
of said machines or extras; that he had failed and neglected
to account to it for any of the cash or notes so received by
him, and had converted all of said property to his own use;
that there was due and owing from him to it, therefr, the
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sum of $4810.95 ; that he had refused to settle or turn over
to it said cash or notes, after being duly demanded. Among
the machines so attached by the defendant herein, as such
sheriff, were three Rawson reapers and four Rawson mowers,
which Lomas had previously received from the plaintiff
herein. September 6, 1886, the plaintiff herein demanded of
said sheriff said seven Rawson machines, which he refused to
deliver, and thereupon the Rawson Manufacturing Company
brought this action against said sheriff to recover $485, as the
value of said seven machines. The said sheriff justified under
said attachment. At the closb of the trial the jury returned
a verdict for the defendant herein, and from the judgment entered thereon the plaintiff brings this appeal.
C. l. Rice, for appellant.
Orr & Lowry, John D. Wilson, and Carter &.Cleary, for respondent.
It is urged that the complaint in the attachCASSODAY, J.
ment suit "alleges a cause of action ex delicto," and hence that
the attachment was improvidently granted, and no justification in the hapds of the sheriff. The substance of the complaint is stated above. It is to the effect that Lomas converted to his own use the moneys and notes he received
as agent. There is no allegation that such conversion
was wrongful, unlawful, or fraudulent. The evidence in
that case probably tended to prove that such conversion was
tortious. But in such cases it is always competent to waive
the tort, and sue on the contract: Walker v. Duncan, 68
Wisc. 624. This is just what was done. The contract between the plaintiff herein and Lomas was'in writing, dated
December 10, 1885, and is to the effect that the plaintiff
agreed to furnish to Lomas, on the conditions therein mentioned, the machines therein described, at the respective
prices therein mentioned, "net," payable by cash or good indorsed notes, taken of farmers, to be indorsed by Lomas, or
to contain a true property statement, showing each purchaser
to be worth $1000 over and above all liabilities and exemptions; and in case any of such notes proved to be uncollectible, Lomas therein agreed to make them good to the plaintiff,
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and to settle for all machines ordered by November 1, 1886,
and to pay for all machines sold, in cash, at such time of settlement. Said machines were to be delivered by the plaintiff
on the cars at Miilwaukee, and Lomas was to pay all freight
and charges on the same. The machines were to be sold in
Grant County only. A discount was to be allowed by the
plaintiff on all cash paid by October 1st; and if the whole
account was then paid in cash, 10 per cent. discount was to
be allowed. Lomas therein agreed to settle for all machines,
drawing notes to the order of the plaintiff, and on their
blanks, anA to sell as per plaintiff's printed warranty, so that
the test would be a matter of fact, not of choice. The plaintiff
therein agreed to furnish all posters, circulars, and pamphlets
free of charge, save the transportation on the same, and Lomas
was to distribute the same. No deductions or promises were
to be allowed save those mentioned in that contract; and the
plaintiff was not to be held liable-in case of fire, or should
the demand exceed the production-in case it could not fill
orders sent it. The coutract also contained this clause: "Any
machines, extras, or notes, taken for machines on hand, are
such that the title and right of ownership do not pass from
the

*

*

*

(plaintiff) until this account is paid in full." The

plaintiff also therein reserved the right to revoke the contract
at any time it deemed itself insecure, and take possession of
said machines and extras.
The Court charged the jury, in effect, that whatever machinery Lomas had received from the plaintiff under the contract, and not paid for at the time of the attachment, was, as
between it and Lomas, the property of the plaintiff; that the
proof showed that the contract was not filed before the attachment, as required by section 2317, Rev. St. That section
provides that "no contract for the sale of personal property,
by the terms of which the title is to remain in the vendor,
and the possession thereof in the vendee, until the purchase
price is paid, or other conditions of sale are complied with,
shall be valid as against any other person than the parties
thereto and those having notice thereof, unless such contract
shall be in writing, subscribed by the parties, and the same
ot a copy thereof shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the
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town, city, or village where the vendee resides," etc. Exception is taken because the Court, in effect, submitted to the
jury the question whether, at the time of levying the attachment, the defendant knew of, or had reasonable cause to believe in, the existence of such contract, or that Lomas was not
at the time the owner of such machines. The Court also
charged, in effect, that in making the attachment, the sheriff
acted, in a sense, as the agent of the AMilwaukee Harvester
Company, and any notice the company, or its authorized
agent in the matter of said suit, might have bad at the time
of the attachment, would be notice that would bind the defendant as such sheriff. There can be no question that the
charge was sufficiently favorable to the plaintiff, if the contract was "for the sale of personal property" upon the condition named in the section, and we are clearly of the opinion
that it was. The contract being of the nature indicated, and
not having been filed as required by the statute, the title to
the seven Rawson machines mentioned must be conclusively
presumed to have been in the vendee, Lomas, who was still
in possession at the time of the levy of the attachment thereon
in favor of his creditors, having no such notice as is mentioned
in the section. Kimball v. Post, 44 Wis. 476. The evidence
sustains the verdict of the jury, and the verdict conclusively
negatives the existence of any such notice.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
In Hunter v. WYarner, 1 Wisc. 146,
the Court decided that what is called
a conditional sale is an agreement to
sell. The Court quoted with approval
West v. Bolton, 4 Vt. R. 558. There,
the vendor in a conditional sale, on
failure of the vendee to pay one instalment, replevied, although the
vendee had paid more than half the
price of the cow. From this case it
appears that the conditional vendee,
on failure to comply with the condition, may either retake possession
of the property or sue for its value.
In Villiams v. Porter, 41 Wisc. 426,
Williams sold two horses to Mallory

for $140, to be paid 1st January,
1885; if payment not made then,
Williams was to be the full owner of
the horses. Pajment was not made
and the contract was not filed by
Williams. The Court held "the
manifest object of the statute is to
place such contracts on the footing of
chattel mortgages, and if a contract
of that kind is not reduced to writing
and filed in the proper offices, it is
void as to third persons, and the property affected by it in the possession
of the vendee is liable to seizure as
his property, in an execution issuedl
upon a judgment against him. In
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this case, the property affected by the
contract was by its terms to renzain in
the possession of the vendee and for
the benefit of the vendor, Williams,
and as his security. He owed this
duty to persons not conversant with
the contract, that it should be filed as
required by the law, that they might
not be led to deal with Mallory as
actual owner, as an inference from his
possession."
It was claimed by the plaintiffs that
section 2317 of the Revised Statutes
of Wisconsin should be construed as
confined to contracts containing two
stipulations in favor of the vendor:
first, that he shall retain, the title till
the purchase price of the property is
paid; and, secondly, that the vendee
shall stipulate to retain the possession,
that is not to sell or otherwise dispose
of the property, till he has paid tho
purchase-money. These are stipulations, that third persons dealing with
the vendee as the owner ought to be
informed of by the vendor if he intends to enforce them against such
persons. By writing and filing of the
contract the public would be warned
not to give credit to the vendee as
owner, or purchase from him as such.
A hypothetical case will show what
consequences would follow fron enforcing a contract in favor of the
vendor, which, when properly filed,
contains only the stipulation that the
title to the property shall remain in
him till the purchase price shall be
paid.
Suppose a home merchant in Fennimose purchases his stock of goods
from furnishing houses in Chicago or
Milwaukee, and upon each invoice or
bill of goods, the buyer and seller
write and sign this agreement: "It
is agreed that the title to the foregoing described goods shall remain in
the seller till the purchase price is
paid." It is, of course, known to the
VOL. XXXVI.-76

seller that the goods are bought by
his customer for the purpose of retailing them at the place of business of
the buyer, where the contract is assumed to be filed, according to section
2317. The wholesale house might
thus retain as potential control over
the property in the store of the local
merchant as if he had never parted
with its possession.
The country
merchant, always largely in debt,
could own nothing, except through
the grace of his master. He could not
sell, assign, or mortgage his stock of
goods unless the wholesale merchant,
the preferred creditor, should be first
paid. The latter can delay, postpone,
or defeat the claims of all other creditors of the local merchant to any
goods not paid for, and yet permit
him to sell the goods without applying the money to the payment of his
lien. The vendor's lien could not be
apportioned, and its amounts reduced
by the daily sales of the local merchant and attached to the goods unsold; this would require another contract to be filed, invoicing the goods
unsold, and the amount still unpaid;
nor could each piece of goods be held
for its invoice price, for this would
create hundreds of distinct contracts
instead of one. The vendee's creditors
should be informed every day of the
amount of the vendor's lien, and the
contract filed at first must give way
to new ones. The meaning of the
reservation in favor of the vendor,
without doubt, is, that the original
contract price for all the goods should
be a lien on what remains to be sold.
In the case supposed, the vendee
not only being authorized to sell the
goods but to appropriate the proceeds
as his own, should be held as to all
persons outside the contract as the
absolute owner of the property. No
man can well have a more ample title
and dominion over personal property
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than its possession and power to sell
it and appropriate the proceeds.
'When the owner has invested the(
vendee with such authority he can
have no right to restrain its exercise.
Such property, according to undisputed authority, is liable to seizure on
execution issued on a judgment
against the vendee, in payment of his
debt: Ludden v. Hazen, 31 Barb. 651 ;
Griswold v. Sheldon, 4 kComstock R.
587; Lewis v. .1cCabe, 49 Conn. 141,
reported in 21 AnERIcAn LAw REGISTER, 217 and notes.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
would probably decide a contract between vendor and vendee of personal
propertywith reservation of title in the
vendor till the purchase price was
paid, yet authorizing the vendee to
sell and appropriate the money, as
wholly void against vendee's execution creditors, whether the contract
was filed or not. [So in other States,
see infra.]
Were such the terms of the Thomas
Lomas's contract, were Lomas authorized to sell the machines and appropriate the money as his own, the
Court would have rightfully decided
that Lomas was the actual owner of
the property at least as far as his
creditors were concerned, and this
would have appeared from the contract itself and its filing could not
alter its terms. The distinction is,
that so far as third persons are concerned with this contract, Lomas was
an agent for the Thomas, nor was it
denied on the sale that the harvester
company knew and recognized Lomas
as plaintiff's agent in selling their
machines.
A principal, unless he
knowingly permits his sales agent to
dispose of his goods under claim of
exclusive ownership, is not required
to make his interest in the property
publicly known, in order to protect it
from executions against the agent in

favor of his creditors. It is the universal custom and usage of manufacturing companies of costly farm ma#chinery, to sell their property through
agents. There are no owners between
the manufacturer and the farmer who
uses the machines, nor would the
manufacturers be willing that their
implements should be sold as general
merchandise, as hoes, axes, and
brooms are. The manufacturers desiring to enlarge their markets and
render their machines popular and
well known, seek out agents fitted by
nature and experience for such business.
The defendant recovered on the
ground of plaintiff's failure to file the
written contract; not for the reason
that it supposed Lomas was the owner
of the machines and was selling them
on his own account. Plaintiff's machines were fresh and new and stenciled and tagged with their names,
and were easily recognizable: Story,
Agency, § 96; Villas v. Mason, 25
Wisc. 310.
It will, perhaps, lead to a better
understanding of section 2317, if the
rulings of Courts anterior to the
statute which is similar to many
which have been enacted in other
States, should be considered. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adjudged conditional sales, where the
property is delivered to the purchaser
with the condition that the title is to
remain in the vendor till the purchasemoney is paid, as absolutely void as
against creditors and purchasers from
the vendee, whether such persons
knew of the condition of sale or not.
So long as that Court adheres to such
decision, it would be of no utility to
write out and publish such contract
to the world, by filing or other means :
Martin v. Mathiot, 14 S. & R. 214.
[See infra.]
In the State of New York and all

-
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the Eastern States, the law has been,
and, perhaps, so remains, that a ven-'
dor retaining title till the price was
paid, might replevy it from a purchaer from his vendee who had purchased it in good faith in ignorance
of the want of title of the party in the
actual possession: Coggill v. H. 6- N.
H. R. R. Co., 3 Gray, '549; Ballard
v. Burgett, 47 Barb. 646; s. c. 40 N.
Y. 314; approved in Bunn v. Valley
Lumber Co., 51 Wise. 380; Budlong v.
Cottrell, 64 Iowa, 234. [And see infra.]
It would not validate the purchasers' title from the conditional
vendee as against the unpaid vendor,
that the latter knew his vendee purchased for the purpose of reselling
and that alone: Burbank v. Crooker,
7 Gray, 158 ; overruling Fitzgeraldv.
Fuller, 19 Hun, 180. But when the
vendor has express authority to sell as
in the principal case, all authorities
agree that the purchaser from him
will have a good title against the
original vendor, whether he be paid
or not: Lewis v. JfcCabe, ante. "If,
however, the contract in question
must be construed to mean that the
plaintiff authorized McAvoy to sell
the property as his own, we should be
constrained to hold it so absolutely
inconsistent with the retention of the
title in the plaintiff as to waive the
condition."
The position assumed by the plaintiff, that the contract intended by the
statute must be one where the vendor
has power to prevent the vendee from
selling-that is, to compel him to retain possession till he pays the price
of the property as security for the
vendor, is implied in Kimball v. Post,
44 Wisc. 476. In that case, a piano
was rented for a term, and the lessee
had the right to purchase it at a given
price at the end thereof, and to retain
possession in the meanwhile. The
Court decided that, though this prob-

ably was a conditional sale, the vendor might sue a mere trespasser who
took possession of the piano without
any right; the non-filing of the contract made no defence as to him. In
Cadle v. McLean, 48 Wise. 631, the
defendant sold Thompson & Co. standing pine timber on certain land.
Thompson & Co. were to cut and
manufacture the timber into lumber,
and were not to dispose of it without the consent of McLean, until the
purchase-money was paid. The agreement was in writing and filed in the
proper office. Thompson & Co. sold
part of the lumber to Cadle, who did
not know of McLean's interest in the
property, and the latter having got
the property into his possession,
Cadle brought his action to recover it.
The Court held that the contract was
such as is defined in section 2317.
The contract prohibited Thompson &
Co., being in possession, from selling ;
that is, they must remain in possession
till they paid the purchase price. The
Court, in deciding that the conditional
vendees after this contract was filed,
could not sell to another, virtually
decides that in such contracts they
must continue in possession, and cannot divest themselves of it even by a
sale. The Court further held, at
least for the sake of analogy, that this
contract might be regarded as a mortgage, as though there had been an
absolute sale and 'delivery of the
property to Thompson & Co., and a
chattel mortgage given back by them
for the purchase price. In case of
such mortgage to McLean, he would
certainly have the right to restrain
Thompson & Co. from selling or otherwise doing any injury to the property
to the detriment of his lien, and even
after the filing, if he should permit
Thompson & Co. to sell the property
thus under his control for any other
purpose than to apply the proceeds
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in the extinguishment of his lien, it
would be a fraud on other creditors
which would render the property
If McLean
liable to their claims.
wished to make his so-called mortgage lien superior to the claims of all
other creditors of Thompson & Co., lie
must file it as lie did, and lie must
have and should exercise the power
of restraining sales or transferring any
possession by Thompson & Co. to
other persons ; and if he did not do so,
he would lose his lien as against other
creditors. In short, section 2317 only
applies where the conditional vendee
agrees to hold possession and not sell
till lie has paid the purchase price,
and where the vendor can compel him
to retain that possession.
Tile contract in the principal case
was not such a contract as the statute
defines, for the reason that the title
was neither intended to remain in the
vendors nor the possession in the
vendee. Where one man sells personal property to another, the parties
can make what stipulation they please
as to price, the time of payment, passing of the title and delivery of possession: 1 Par. Cont. p. 526.
In this case, plaintiffs sold their
machinery to Lomas at four months'
credit, Lomas to take immediate possession and sell the machines, the
proceeds to belong to the plaintiff till
the purchase price was paid. The
title, it is stipulated, was to remain
in the plaintiffs till they were fully
paid, but this language is at variance
with a controlling provision in the
contract which makes it the duty of
Lomas to sell the machines to those
desiring to use hem as fast as he can ;
of course, the title to a machine could
only remain in the plaintiffs until
Lomas made a sale. Hereis a material
deviation from the contract defined in
the statute and one following by

different consequences.
Here, the
plaintiffs sold the machines as owners
through Lomas as their agent. No
injury could have been done to
Lomas's creditors because they had
not been notified by the plaintiffs, by
filing the contract or otherwise, of this
relation between them and the plaintiffs. The character of Lomas's business notified all persons of that; the
contract would not have told them of
more. Neither had Lomas's creditors
any vested right to this contract when
it was made that would estop the
parties thereto from altering it as
they pleased. They could extend the
time in which Lomas was to pay the
contract price for the machines, or
Lomas could have been released from
that contract of purchasing the
machines in tot, and his creditors could
not complain although the contract
might be very favorable to Lomas's
expected profit. Plaintiffs could have
authorized Lomas to use the money
on sales for his own benefit, instead
of applying it to the payment of what
he owed plaintiffs for the machines;
and for this, Lomas's creditors could
not complain. But under a contract
of the character defined in the statute,
since the plaintiffs, to make their title
or lien effectual, must keep the property in the vendee's possession and
not permit him to dispose of it, and so
incur a duty to the unpreferred creditors of Lomas whom they may hinder
and delay; plaintiffs and Lomas by
assent between themselves could not
have permitted Lomas to use the property for his own benefit or otherwise
dispose of it, except for paying his
own debts, without subjecting it to
the executions or attachments of such
creditors: 1tewart v. Deuster, 23 Wis.
136; 61 Wise. 390.
J. I. MiLLs.
Lancaster, Wise.
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The case of Lewis v. McCabe, as
pointed out above, appeared in 21
AXERicAN LAw REGISTER, 217-235,
with an annotation, giving the condition of the law in most of the Courts
of this country down to 1882. One
of the editors of THE REGISTER, in the
last edition of Benjamin on Sales
(Bennett's edition, 1888, pp. 271-8),
has furnished a convenient digest of
the American cases on this subject,
to a recent date, arranged by States.
Cases decided since the publication
of this edition are subjoined together
with some of the State statutes commented on, and such older cases as
are necessary to show the present
condition of the law in this country.
In the United States Supremp Court,
the decisions of Hervey v. The Locomotire Works, 93 U. S. 664 (1876), and
Herryford v. Davis, 102 U. S. 235
(1880), have been followed in the
cases arising from the foreclosure of
the mortgages on the Chicago, Danville, and Vincennes R. R., 99 U. S.
235, 256, 258 (1878), and in Harkness
v. Russell, 118 U.S. 663 (1886). In the
latter case, the Court decidedly express the opinion, that the decisions
supporting the Illinois doctrine "are
few in number, compared with those
in which it is held that conditional
sales are valid and lawful, as well
against third persons, as against the
parties to the contract. * * * But as
the rulings of this Court have been,
as we think, somewhat misunderstood, we have thought it proper to
examine the subject with some care,
and to state what we regard as the
general rule of law, where it is
not affected by local statutes or local
decisions to the contrary:" per
BRADLEY, J.

The illinois docrine is very nearly
in conformity with the English bankrupt law as interpreted by their
Courts and is this: "If a person
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agrees to sell to another a chattel, on
condition that the price shall be paid
within a certain time, retaining title
in himself in the meantime, and delivers the chattel to the vendee so as
to clothe him with the apparent
ownership, a bona .fide purchaser or
an execution creditor of the latter is
entitled to protection as against the
claim of the original vendor :" BRADLv,
J. llarkness v. Russell, 118 U.
S. 678, and citations. The immediate
delivery of personal property, capable
of such change of possession, is equally
insisted upon where a purchase is made
for cash paid: the vendor allowed to
retain possession, can make a good
title by delivery to a second purchaser
for value, in good faith and without
knowledge of the first sale: Gradle v.
Kern, 109 Ill. (1884). See infra, II.,
for statute relating to railroad equipment.
Kentucky follows the Illinois doctrine, unless a lien is reserved. See
infra, II.
The Marylland Court of Appeals
(Lincoln v. Qulnn et al.,Jan. 6,
1888, per BRYAN, J.) said that twenty
years had passed since Hall v. uinks,
21 Md. 406 (1863), and this decision
had been repeatedly approved in deciding "that a bona fide purchaser,
without notice of the condition upon
which his vendor has acquired the
possession, will be protected against
the claim of the original vendor, in
the same manner where the sale and.
delivery are conditional as where the
possession has been obtained by
fraud." And this principle was then
extended to a bonafide mortgagee without !notice, but refused to one with
notice.
In Pennsylvania there is no statutory regulation, and the same doctrine
prevails as to sales. Irre Book Sewing Machine Co., Limited, v. Crowell,
decided by the Supreme Court of that
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State, January 17, 1887, adhered to
the former decisions, holding that a
contract to purchase a patented machine for notes, but no bill of sale to
be given until the maturity of the
notes, and if the notes should not be
then paid, any payments on account
to be considered rental and royalty,
and the contract to terminate and the
seller to resume possession, was a
clear case of a conditional sale on
credit. The provision intended to
convert the contract into a bailment,
if the purchase-money should not be
paid, was insufficient to make it a
bailment, ab initio, and possession
having been given to the buyer, his
creditor could seize and sell the machine, notwithstanding the fact that
lie knew the terms of the contract.
In a previous case, the Court had
pointed out that the test is uniformly
a question whether the parties intended to leave the title in the seller
as security for the price: this would
be a conditional sale. If a bailment
was really intended, though coupled
with an agreement to sell, this would
be valid even against the creditors of
the buyers : Appeal of Edwards etal.,
105 Penna. St. 103 (1884) ; so, Dando
v. Foulds, Id. 74 (1884) ; and Forrest
v. Nelson, 108 Id. 481 (1885); all
affirmed in Wheeler TV.ilson 3ffg. Co.
v. Ieil, 115 Id. 487 (1886).
Later in the same year, May 2,
1887, while deciding Mertz v. The H.
IF. Collender Co., the Court conceded
" that the line is not sharply defined
between the cases which hold that a
chattel, held under a bailment and
conditional sale, will be liable to execution, as the property of the bailee,
and the other cases which declare that
the property of the vendor shall not
be so liable." Still, the Court was
satisfied that a "letting" of a billiard
table, rent paid in advance by notes,
except a small cash payment at the

end of the term, possession delivered
with agreement for recovery by seller
on failure to pay any of the notes,
and agreement to give a bill of sale
when full payment had been made,
was a bailment, good against the
buyer's creditors.
In the latest reported case, the
Court held the principle that retention of title is a fraud, was "too obvious and settled to allow of discussion:" Shaeffer v. Zech, May 25,
1888.
The Pennsylvania doctrine is founded upon the public policy adopted in
that Commonwealth, and depends
upon the possession and acts of ownership, exercised by the conditional
vendee. No regard is paid by the
Courts there, to the legal effect of the
contract, or the place where it has
been made. It is conceded that the
property remains in the vendor, as
between the parties and those having
notice, but as to others possession
under such a condition is considered
a badge of fraud and the vendor's reserved title is not allowed to be
asserted against not only bona fide
purchasers from the vendee, but even
his creditors. Hence, this doctrine is
local and has no extra-territorial effect,
and in another State the conditional
contract will be construed according
to the law of the situs
: Marvin Safe
Co. v. Norton, 48 N. J. Law, 410
(1886).
The other States and the Territories
all start from the common basis of the
validity of a conditional sale against
any claims by the creditor of the conditional vendee, or any buyer from
him, but, one by one, statutory notice
is being required, varying in detail,
as shown below.
In all cases the
sales are valid between the parties
notwithstanding the statute.
I. Nine States and Territoriesrequire
recording in soie cases:-
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Alabama ordains that "contracts
for the conditional sale of railroad
equipment or rolling stock, by the
terms of which the vendor retains
title until payment of the purchasemoney, and the purchaser obtains
possession, are void against the judgment creditors of the purchaser without notice, or purchasers from him
for a valuable consideration without
notice, unless such contracts are in
writing, and, within three months
after the making thereof, recorded in
the office of the judge of the probate
of the county in which such corporation may have its principal office or
place of business; and if it has not in
this State a principal office or place
of business, then in the office of the
secretary of state; and, in addition,
all cars or engines so sold must have
thereon plainly marked the name of
the vendor:" Code (1886), § 1821.
Otherwise, conditional sales are valid,
even against a bona fide purchaser for
value and without notice: Fairbanks,
Aforse 6- Co. v. The Eureka Co., 67
Ala. 109 (1880), and Sumner v. Woods,
Id. 139 (1880).
Arizona declares that "The following instruments of writing, which
shall have been acknowledged or
proved according to law, are authorized to be recorded, viz: all deeds,
mortgages, conveyances, deeds of
trust, bonds for title, covenants, defeasances or other instruments of
writing concerning any lands and
tenements, or goods and chattels, or
movable property of any description,
***
and all deeds of trust and
mortgages whatsoever, which shall
hereafter be made and executed, shall
be void as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration without notice, unless they
shall be acknowledged or proved and
filed * * * with the recorder; but
the same, as between the parties and

their heirs and as to all subsequent
purchasers, with notice thereof, or
without valuable consideration, shall
nevertheless be valid and binding :"
Rev. Stat. § 2601, 2602. There are
no decisions upon this statute at hand,
but it clearly does not apply to conditional sales by verbal contract.
In Arkansas, the sale of a chattel,
with reservation of title until the lturchase-money is paid, is valid against
a second buyer for a valuable consideration without notice: AlcIntosh v.
Beam S- Hill, 47 Ark. 363 (1886);
M_1cRea et al. v. M1errifield et al., 48
Id. 160 (1886); Simpson et al. v.
Shackleford et al., S. Ct. Ark., April 9,
1887; unless the possession remains
with the vendee for more than five
years, without payment of the price:
Deal v. Hecht, U. S. Circ. Ct. E. D.
Arkansas, 1880; 5 Fed. Rep. 419;
Digest of 1884, § 3377.
In Dakota, "where railroad equipment and rolling stock may have been
or shall be sold to any person, firm, or
corporation, to be paid for in whole or
in part, in instalments, or shall be
leased, rented, hired, or delivered on
condition that the same may be used
by the person, firm, or corporation
purchasing, leasing, renting, hiring,
or receiving the same, and that the
title to the same shall remain in the
vendor, lessor, renter, hirer, or deliverer of the same until the agreed
upon price of or rent for such property shall have been fully paid, such
condition in regard to the title so remaining in the vendor, lessor, renter,
hirer, or deliverer, until such payments are fully made, shall be valid
for all intents and purposes as to subsequent purchasers in good faith and
creditors; provided, the term during
which the instalments of rent are to
be paid shall not exceed ten years,
and such contract shall be in writing
and acknowledged.
Such contract
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shall be recorded in the office of the
secretary of the territory, and in the
county in which is located the principal office or place of business of such
vendee or lessee; and on each locomotive and car that may have been or
may be so sold or leased, the name
of the vendor or lessor, or assignee of
the vendor or lessor, shall be marked,
followed by the word 'owner' or
'lessor' as the case maybe:" Sess.
Laws 1883, c. 93, §§ 1, 2; Levisee's
Code, §§ 1814, i. and j.
In Florida, on a sale and delivery
of printing machinery for part cash
and balance on credit, with condition
that the title should not pass until
full payment, the Court held this to
be a conditional sale, valid against
subsequent judgment creditors and
purchasers for a valuable consideration, without notice: Campbell .Anfr.
Co. v. W~alker, 22 Florida, 412 ; s. c. 25
AmERICAN LAw RoISTER, 677 (1886),
following JacksonSharpe Co. v. Holland,
14 Fla. 384 (1874) ; though the Court
thought the contract ought to be recorded if the payments should not be
all made before the expiration of two
years, the statute providing that
"where any reservation or limitation
shall be pretended to have been made
of a use or property by way of condition, reversion, remainder, or otherwise, in goods and chattels, the possession whereof shall have remained
in another as aforesaid," that is, for
two years, "the same shall be taken
as to the creditor and purchasers of
the persons aforesaid so remaining in
possession, to be fraudulent within
this Act, and that the absolute property is with the possessor, unless
such * * * reservation, or limitation
of use or property, were declared by
will or deed in writing, proved and recorded as aforesaid:" McClell. Dig.
p. 212, § 4.
Illinois has receded from her posi-

tion, "in all cases where any cars,
locomotives, or vehicles used upon
railways shall be delivered to any
person or persons, or corporation, by
the manufacturer or builder thereof,
under lease, bailment, conditional
sale, or other contract, providing that
the title to the same shall remain in,
or not pass from the lessor, bailor, or
conditional vendor, until conditions
fulfilled according to the terms of such
contract, such contract shall be held
and considered good, valid, and effectual, according to the terms, tenor,
and effect thereof, beth in law and in
equity, as against all persons whatsoever, when the same shall be reduced
to writing, acknowledged, and filed
for record as hereinafter mentioned.
The provisions of this Act shall apply
only to sales made by manufacturers
to purchasers, and no contract made
in pursuance hereof shall be good for
a longer period than four years, nor
shall any such contract be renewed.
* * * This act shall not apply to
railway rolling stock leased in the ordinary way without condition regarding purchase and sale, nor shall it
affect the legality of any instrument
of sale or lease existing at the time of
the passing of this Act. * ** Prorided,the lessor, bailor, or conditional
vendor shall, within ten days from the
first day of January in each year, file
a sworn statement with the recorder
of each county where the lease or sale
bill * * * is recorded, and pay the
recorder for putting the same on record, which statement shall show the
names and dates and description of
the contract and the amount due and
unpaid thereon; and upon failure to
make such statement, or if such statement is false, or made with the intent
to deceive and mislead any creditor of
said railroad in any way, then such
lessor, bailor, or conditional vendor
shall thereby lose all benefits which
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he or they would otherwise have
* * * :" Laws, 1881, p. 126.
.3laine declares that "no agreement
that personal property, bargained and
delivered to anotherfor which a note is
given, shall remain the property of
the payee till the note is paid, is valid
unless it is made and signed as a part
of the note, nor when it is so made
and signed in a note for more than
thirty dollars, except as between the
original parties to said agreement,
unless it is recorded like mortgages
of personal property :" Act of Feb.
20, 1874, ch. 181, amending Rev.
Stat. ch. 111, § 5.
In .Mississippi, § 1300 of the Code
of 1880, p. 373, is peculiar in giving
notice, by providing that "If any
person shall transact business as a
trader, or otherwise, with the addition
of the words agent, factor, a,,d comnpany, or and co., or like words, and
fail to disclose the name of his principal, or partner, by a sign in letters
easy to be read, placed conspicuously
at the house where such business is
transacted, or if any person shall
transact business in his own name,
without any such addition, all the property, stock, money, and choses in
action, used or acquired in such
business, shall, as to the creditors of
any such person, be liable for his
debts, and be, in all respects, treated
in favor of his creditors, as his
But except as to traders
property."
(which jewellers are), conditional
sales of personal property of every
kind, when the vendor delivers
possession and retains the title until
paid, at any time within three years
(Code, § 1293) remain valid: Paine*
v. Hall's S. 4- Co., S. Ct. Miss. Jan.
10, 1887.
New York does not require recording on a conditional sale of household
goods, pianos, organs, scales, engines
and boilers, portable saw-mills and
VOL. XXXVI.-77

saw machines, threshing machines
and horse powers, mowing machines,
reapers, and harvesters, and grain
drills, with their attachments ; the
contract of sale must be in duplicate
and one copy delivered to the purchaser: Act, May 29, 1886, cl. 495.
Otherwise, "in every contract for the
conditional sale of goods and chattels
hereafter made, which shall be accompanied by an immediate delivery, and
be followed by An actual and continued change of possession of the
things contracted to be sold, all conditions and reservations which provide that the ownership of such goods
and chattels is to remain in the person
so contracting to sell the same, or
other person than the one so contracting to buy them until said goods or
chattels are paid for, or until the
occurring of any future event or contingency, shall be absolutely void as
against subsequent purchasers and
mortgagees in good faith, and as to
them the sale shall be deemed absolute, unless such contract for sale
with such conditions and reservations
therein, or a true copy thereof shall
be filed" of record, and a true copy
again filed, thirty days before the end
of one year from such filing of record :
Act May 21, 1884, ch. 315, and Act
June 11, 1888, ch. 488. Before the
Acts, the law was the same as in
Massachusetts, see Harkness v. Rlissell,
118 U. S. 673 (1886), per BRADLEY,J.

II. Georgia, in 1881, enacted, that
whenever pe.. onal property is sold
and delivered with the condition
affixed to the sale, that the title thereto is to remain in vendor of such
personal property until the purchase
price thereof shall have been paid,
every such conditional sale, in order
for the reservation of title to be valid
as against third parties, shall be evidenced in writing, and not otherwise.
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And the written contract of every
such conditional sale shall be executed
and attested in the same manner as is
now provided by existing laws for the
execution and attestation of mortgages
oil personal property: Provided, nevertheless, that, as between the parties
themselves, the contract, as made by
them, shall be valid, and may be enforced, whether evidenced in writing
or not. The existing statutes and
laws of this State in relation to the
registration and record of mortgages
on personal property, shall apply to
and affect all conditional sales of personal property as defined in this section :" Code of 1882, % 1955. This
statute does not apply to instruments
in existence, or transactions occurring
before its enactment: Bowen v. Frickc
6- Co., 75 Ga. 786 (1885). The statute
has an exception, that "cotton, corn,
rice, crude turpentine, spirits of turpentine, rosin, pitch, tar, or other
products sold by planters and commission merchants on cash sale,
shall not be considered as the property of the buyer, or the ownership given up until the same shall be
fully paid for, although it may have
been delivered into the possession of
the buyer :" Id. 1593, as amended
by Acts July 30, 1885, and October
13, 1885, Laws, pp. 45, 52. See Roberts
v. Surannah, etc., R. Co., 75 Ga. 225.
The Iowa Code, P 1922, provides
that "No sale, contract, or lease,
wherein the transfer of title or ownership of personal property is made to
depend upon any condition, shall be
valid against any creditor or purchaser of the vendee or lessee in
actual possession, obtained in pursuance thereof without notice, unless
the same be in writing, executed by
the vendor or lesso, acknowledged
and recorded the same as chattel
mortgages." This statute does not
reach a case where an attachment is

laid on property in the hands of a
sub-agent for the debts of an agent,
because the plaintiff in such proceeding is not a creditor nor a purchaser from the sub-agent, and the
question of title in the agent would
have to be decided outside of the
statute: South Bend Iron Works v.
Cottrell et al., U. S. Circ. Ct. N. D.
Iowa, May Term, 1887, 31 Fed. Rep.
254. As to notice, this may be constructive as afforded by the record, or
actual: Warner v. Jameson, 52 Iowa, 70
(1879); but no inquiry or diligence in
seeking information of an unrecorded
contract is required, the statute relieving the creditor or purchaser from
the buyer: .oline low Co. v. Braden
etal. (1887), 71 Iowa, 141.
Kentucky provides that "no deed of
trust or mortgage, conveying a legal
or equitable title to real or personal
estate, shall be valid against a purchaser for a valuable consideration
without notice thereof, until such deed
shall be acknowledged or proved according to law, and lodged for record:"
Gen. Stat. Ch. 24, § 10. The Court
of Appeals have held, that, where a
sale had been made with a reservation
of title to railroad cars, this simply
created a lien, valid between the
parties but not affecting the rights of
purchasers and creditors, unless the
contract should be recorded, as provided in the statute: Barney 6- S.
AIfg. Co. v. Hart, Receiver, Sept. 16,
1886; Hart v. Barney, etc., Co., U. S.
Ciro. Ct. Dist. Ky. May 1881, 7 Fed.
Rep. 543; Vaughn, etc., v. Hopson, 10
Bush (Ky.), 337 (1874), overruling
Pattonv. 3fc Cane, 15 B. Monroe (Ky.),
555 (1855).
Minnesota requires that "every note
of hand or other evidence of indebtedness or contract, the conditions of
which are that the title or ownership
to the property for which said note or
other evidence of indebtedness or con-
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tract is given, remains in the vendor,
shall be absolutely void, as against
the creditors of the vendee, and as
against subsequent purchasers and
mortgagees in good faith, unless the
note or other evidence of indebtedness
or contract, or true copies thereof, or,
if said contract be oral, then a memorandum expressing the terms and conditions thereof be filed" as therein
provided; this creates sufficient notice until "after the expiration of one
year from the day on which such note,
or other evidence of indebtedness or
contract, became due:" Act 1873, c.
65, incorporated in Gen. Stat. 1878, c.
39, §§ 15-20, and amended by Gen.
Laws, 1883, c. 38, § 2. Under this
statute actual notice was held to be
sufficient to preserve the vendor's
title, in the absence of filing, in analogy to the decisions upon the effect
of actual notice of an unrecorded
deed of real estate or of a chattel
mortgage: Dyer v. norstad (Oct. 1,
1886), 35 Minn. 534.
The MissouriRev. Code, § 2507, provides that "in all cases where any
personal property shall be sold to any
person, to be paid for, in whole or in
part, in instalments, or shall be leased,
rented, hired, or delivered to another
on condition that the same shall
belong to the person purchasing,
leasing, renting, hiring, or receiving
the same whenever the amount paid
shall be a certain sum, or the value
of such property, the title to the same
to remain in the vendor, lessor, renter,
hirer, or deliverer of the same, until
such sum or the value of such property, or any part thereof, shall have
been paid, such condition, in regard.
to the title so remaining until such
payment, shall be void as to all subsequent purchasers in good faith, and
creditors, unless such condition shall
be evidenced by writing, executed,
acknowledged, and recorded, as pro-

vided in cases of mortgages of personal property." This statute does
not avoid a conditional sale between
the parties, or as against purchasers
with actual notice, antecedent creditors in all cases and subsequent creditors with notice: Tifts v. Thompson,
22 Mo. App. 564 (1886); Defiance
Mach. Wk's. v. Trisler, 21 Id. 69
(1886); Coover v. Johnson, 86 Mo. 533
(1885); lestern L. 6- C. Co. v.
Plumb et al., U. S. Ciro. Ct. N. Dist.
Ill. May 24, 1886, 27 Fed. Rep. 598.
Nor does it include goods consigned to
be sold on commission: Peet et al. v.
Spencer, 90 Mo. 384 (1886).
In Nebraska, "no sale, contract, or
lease, wherein the transfer of title or
ownership of personal property is
made to depend upon any condition,
shall be valid against any purchaser
or judgment creditor of the vendee or
lessee in actual possession, obtained
in pursuance of such sale, contract,
or lease, without notice, unless the same
be in writing, signed by the vendee or
lessee, and a copy thereof filed in the
office of the clerk of the county,
within which such vendee or lessee
resides; said copy shall have attached
thereto an affidavit of such vendor or
lessor, or his agent or attorney, which
shall set forth the names of the vendor and vendee or lessor and lessee, or
[and] description of the property
transferred and the full and true interest of the vendor or lessor therein:"
Comp. Stat. ch. 32, § 26. This record
remains valid for five years, with provision for annual renewal thereafter.
This statute invalidates secret liens in
favor of the seller: .3anning et al. v.
Cunningham, S. Ct. Neb. Feb. 24,
1887.
New Hampshire (Statute of 1885,
ch. 30, § 1,) provides that "no lien
reserved on personal property sold
conditionally and passing into the
hands of a conditional purchaser shall
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be valid against attaching creditors, or
subsequent purchasers without notice,
unless the vendor of such property
takes a written memorandum, signed
by the purchaser, witnessing such lien
and the sum due thereon, and causes
it to be recorded in the town clerk's
office of the town where the purchaser
of such property resides, if he resides
in the State, otherwise in the town
clerk's office of the town where the
vendor resides, within ten days after
such property is delivered."
Section
2 provides for the affidavit of the
parties to the good faith of the transaction. Where a written memorandum was made of a hiring, with condition that the goods should become
the absolute property of the hirer
when all the rent had been paid, and
for a return of the goods if the rent
should not be paid, this was held to
be a conditional sale, and in the absence of the affidavit to the good faith
of the transaction and of recording,
was held void as against a creditor of
the hirer: Gerrish etal. v. Clark, S.
Ct. N. H. March 16, 1888. But such
a sale is good against the assignee in
insolvency of the buyer: Adams v.
Lee, Id.
In N orth Carolina, the Code of 1883,
provides that "all conditional sales
of personal property in which the
title is retained by the bargainor,
shall be reduced to writing and registered in the same manner, for the
same fees and with the saine legal effect as is provided for chattel mortgages :" § 1275. This statute was held
inapplicable to a lease of furniture,
bedding, etc., for a stipulated rent,
with condition that the property
could be purchased at any time during the lease for the aggregate sum of
the rent: this was a lease and not a
conditional sale and need not be in
writing nor registered, and a creditor
of the lessee could not seize the pro-

perty: Foreman v. Drake, D8 N. C.
311 (1887).
Ohio permitted the vendor to retain
the title pending the payment of the
purchase-money, even as against innocent purchasers from his vendee
(Case Mllaqfr. Co. v. Garvin, S. Ct.
Ohio, Oct. 25, 1887), until the first
day of July, 1885, when a statute
went in effect,
providing "that in all
cases where any personal property
shall be sold to any person, to be paid
for in whole or in part, in instalnents,
or shall be leased, rented, hired, or
delivered to another on condition that
the same shall belong to the person
purchasing, leasing, renting, hiring,
or receiving the same, whenever the
amount paid shall be a certain sum,
or the value of such property, the
title to remain in the vendor, lessor,
renter, hirer, or deliverer of the same,
until such sum, or the value of such
property, or any part thereof, shall
have been paid, such condition, in regard to the title so remaining until
such payment, shall be void as to all
subsequent purchasers, and mortgagees in good faith, and creditors, unless such condition shall be evidenced
by writing, signed by the purchaser,
lessor, renter, hirer, or receiver of the
same, and als6 a statement thereon,
under oath, made by the person so
selling, leasing, or delivering any
property as herein provided, his agent,
or attorney of the amount of the claim,
or a true copy thereof, with an affidavit that the same is a copy, deposited
with the clerk of the township where
the person signing the instrument resides at the time of the execution
thereof, if a resident of the State, and if
not such resident, then with the clerk
of the township in which such property
is sold, leased, rented, hired, or delivered, is situated at the time of the
execution of the instrument ;" or with
the county recorder, if his office is
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kept in such township (82 Laws of
Ohio, 238). This is substantially the
same provision as those relating to
chattel mortgages: §% 4150-2, Rev.
Stat. Ohio.
The South Carolina statute ordains
that "no mortgage, or other instrument of writing in the nature of a
mortgage, of personal property shall
be valid, so as to affect, from the time
of such delivery or execution, the
rights of subsequent creditors, or purchaser for valuable consideration without notice, unless recorded within forty
days from the time of such delivery
or execution, in the office of register
of mesne conveyances of the county
where the owner of said property resides, if he reside within the State;
or, if he resides without the State, of
the county where such personal property is situated at the time of the delivery or execution of said deeds or
instruments : Provided, nevertheless,
That the above-mentioned deeds or
instruments in writing, if recorded
subsequent to the expiration of said
period of forty days, shall be valid to
affect the rights of subsequent creditors and purchasers for valuable consideration without notice, only from
the date of such record :" Gen. Stat.
1882, ch. xcv. § 2346. The other
"instrument of writing" includes a
promissory note, given for the purchase of a fire-proof safe, and embodying these words, that the sellers "do
not part with any title thereto, until
the purchase-money has been fully
paid." The safe could be taken in
execution, while in the buyer's possession, by his subsequent creditors,
because the note had not been recorded: the statute "was intended to
embrace such conditional sales as the
one in this case, and in that way to
cut up, root and branch, all secret
liens, whether written or verbal, in respect to the rights of sequent credi-

tors and purchasers for valuable consideration without notice :" Herring
4- Co. v. Cannon, 21 S. Car. 212
(1884).
Texas has departed from the principle laid down in City Nat'l Bank-v.
Tufts, 63 Tex. 113 (1885), followed in
Tufts v. Cleveland, decided February
4, 1887, by enacting "that all reservations of the title to or property in
chattels as security for the purchasemoujey thereof, shall be held to be
chattel mortgages, and shall, when
possession is delivered to the vendee,
be void as to creditors and bona fide
purchasers, unless such reservations
be in writing and registered as required of chattel mortgages :" Gen.
Laws, 1885, c. 78, § 1, p. 76. And,
in addition, the general principle was
also adhered to that the attempt to
protect a stock of goods, sold and replaced in the course of trade, by a
reservation of title in the seller of the
original goods until he should be paid
must be held fraudulent: Loving lhb.
Co. v. Johnson et al., S. Ct. Texas,
May 13, 1887.
Vermont has a statute, verbally the
same as %1 of the New Hamp. stat.,
except the time of recording is extended to 30 days : Rev. Stat. § 1992.
This statute does not invalidate the
conditional sale as to creditors with
notice: Whitconib v. Woodworth, 54
Vt. 544 (1882).
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has, this year, decided that "an
unrecorded contract of conditional
sale of personal property is valid, as
against purchasers from the vendee,
without notice," on the ground that
the weight of American authority is
in accordance with the common-law
rule, as laid down by the Supreme
Court of the United States. (Supra.)
The doctrine that possession is one of
the evidences of title was repudiated
as encouraging carelessness in the
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buyer, who is bound to inquire into
the seller's title in cases of hiring, or
lending, or leaving goods to be made,
and who ought not in cases of conditional sales only to infer title from one
of three elements of true title. The
-Legislature, however, differed on the
expediency of such sales, and by the
Revised Code, to take effect May 1,
188, provided, § 2462, p. 599, that
"every sale or contract for the sale of
goods or chattels, wherein the title is
reserved until the same be paid for,
in whole or in part, or the transfer of
the title is made to depend on any condition, and possession be delivered to
the vendee, shall be void as to creditors of and purchasers for value without notice from such vendee, unless
such sale or contract be evidenced by
writing executed by the vendor, in
which the said reservation or condition is expressed, and until and except from the time the said writing is
duly admitted to record in the county
or corporation in which said goods or
chattels may be, or, if said goods and
chattels consist of locomotives, cars,
or other rolling stock, equipment or
personal property of any description,
to be used in or about the operation
of any railroad, until and except from
the time the said writing is duly admitted to record in the clerk's office of
the county or corporation court of the
county or corporation wherein the
principal office in this State of the
company operating the railroad is located, or in the clerk's office of the
Chancery Court of the City of Richmond, if said principal office is within the corporate limits of the said city,
and a copy of said writing be filed in
the office of the Board of Public Works,
and each locomotive, car, or other
piece of the rolling stock, be plainly
and permanently marked with the
name of the vendor on both sides
thereof, followed by the word owner."
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2468 provides for recording in

another county, to which the goods

arerenmoved, within one year after the
removal ; otherwise, to "be void as to
such creditors or purchasers" in every
case, except that as to the interests of
married women (not her separate estate), of infants, and of insane persons, the time for recording is one
year after removal of disability.
e'estVirginiadeclares, that "if any
sale be made of goods and chattels,
reserving the title until the same is
paid for, or otherwise, and possession
be delivered to the buyer, such reservation shall be void as to creditors of,
and purchasers without notice from,
such buyer, unless a notice of such
reservation be recorded in the office
of the clerk of the county court of the
county where the property is, or in
case said goods and chattels consist
of engines, cars, or other rolling stock,
or equipment to be used in or about
the operation-of any railroad, unless
such notice be recorded in the office
of the Secretary of State. * * * Code,

1887, ch. lxxiv. 3. The other portions of this section do not relate to
such sales: See Blackwell et al. v.
Walker et al., U. S. Circ. Ct. E. D.
Ark. 1880, 5 Fed. Rep. 419. Such
sales are good between the parties:
McGinnis et al. v. Savage et al., S.
Ct. App. February 2, 1887.
Wiqsconsn : See, above, p. 585, sqq.
III. One State requiring writing, in
some cases, but not recording.
Afassadinsetts requires that "all
contracts for the sale of furniture or
other household effects, made on condition that the title to the property
sold shall not pass until the price is
paid in full, whether such contract be
in the form of a lease or otherwise,
shall be in writing, and a copy thereof shall be furnished the vendee by
the vendor, at the time of such sale,
"and all payments made by or in be-
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half of the vendee, and charges,
whether in the nature of interest or
otherwise, as they accrue, shall be
indorsed by the vendor or his agent,
upon such copy, if the vendee so requests. If the vendor fails to comply
with any of the provisions of this
section through negligence, his rights
under such contract shall be suspended while such default continues;
and if he refuses or wilfully or fraudulently fails to comply with any of
such provisions, he shall be deemed
to have waived the condition of such
sale :" %1 (complete), ch. 313, Acts
1884, 342. Otherwise, the validity
of conditional sales was affirmed in
Blanchard v. Cooke, 144 Mass. 207
(1887).
IV. Seventeen States and Territories
require neither writing nor recording.
In California no title was held to
pass on a conditional sale of wood to
be cut and to remain on seller's land
until one dollar per cord should be
paid; before payment the sheriff
seized and sold the wood as the property of the buyer, and the seller was
-allowed to recover the full value of
the wood: Stokes v. Baleam, S. Ct.
Cal. July 27,1887. But shortly before
this the Court held that they would
look into the intention to observe,
whether the parties meant a conditional sale with reservation of title
or a sale in which the substantial
ownership would be vested in the
buyer, with security for payment,
and hold the latter to the requirements of chattel mortgages: Palmer et
al. v. Howard, S. Ct. Cal. May 20,1887.
Colorado extends the provisions of
her chattel mortgage laws, which require delivery of possession to the
mortgagee, or acknowledgment and
recording, Gen. Stat. ch. xiv. § 163,
"to all such bills of sale, deeds of
trust, and other conveyances of personal property, as shall have the

effect of a mortgage or lien upon such
property: Id. § 169.
It is presumable that reservation
of title would be distinguished from a
lien.
Connecticut sustains conditional
sales: Cooley v. Gillan, 54 Conn. 80
(1886), and Varren Mfg. Co. v. Norwich, etc., Co. et al., S. Ct. Errors,
March, 1888, citing Lewis v. McCabe,
49 Conn. 141 (1881) ; but "any property sold upon condition, and put by
the vendor into the visible possession
of the vendee, unless otherwise exempt from execution, may be attached
and levied upon and sold or set out
on execution in any suit against such
vendee, subject to the rights of the
vendor to its possession or ownership;
and the party attaching or levying
shall have the same rights, which the
vendee would otherwise have had to
tender to the vendor performance of
the conditions of sale; and all parties
deriving title under the execution
shall succeed to all the rights of the
vendee, in relation to such property :"
Gen Stat. Revis. 1875, Tit. 19, ch. 2,

35.
Delaware Courts hold conditional
sales of personal property to be valid;
and, where delivery of property is
made upon agreement that no title
shall pass until payment is made or
some other thing is done or occurs,
no title passes to the party to whom
the property is delivered, until the
condition is fulfilled; and none can
be passed to his vendee, no matter
how ignorant of the secret contract:
Watertown Steam Engine Co. v. Davis,
4 Hous. (Del.) 192, and in the U. S.
Dist. Ct. (Dist. Md.), the Court say"It is conceded that there is no statute of Delaware which affects the
question of a conditional delivery of
chattels, or which legislates with regard to bills of lading, and there is no
rule of the common law which forbids
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such a transaction," citing Ilarkness v.

and without notice, under circumstan-

Russell, supra; The John K. Shaw,
April 12, 1887, 32 Fed. Rep. 491.
Idaho has no statute, and in the
absence of any decisions the general
rule would seem applicable.
In Indiana the Supreme Court has
affirmed the rule that "where the
owner of personal property sells and
delivers it to a purchaser, not for the
purpose of consumption or re-sale, at
any agreed price, payable at a future
day, upon the express condition and
agreement that the title to such property should remain in the vendor
thereof until the purchase price was
fully paid, the vendee of such property, prior to such payment, can
neither sell nor incumber the property
in such manner as to defeat the title
of the original owner and vendor
thereof;" but otherwise, when the
property is delivered for a re-sale,
such condition "must be deemed
fraudulent and void as against purchasers from the original vendee:"
v. Carman,
Wlinchester TEV.W.
Hfg.
M
109 Ind. 31 (1887).
The Kansas Courts uphold conditional sales even against a bona fide
purchaser; neither the statute relating to frauds (Comp. Laws, 1885,
§§ 2617, 2818), nor to chattel mortgages (Id. §§ 3499 et seq.), apply: Sum,ur v. McFarlan, 25 Kan. 600 (1875),
and Hallowell v. Ailne, 26 Id. 65
(1876).
In MIichigan, the Supreme Court,
after saying that the vendor's rights
in a conditional sale are recognized
against mortgagees (Hood v. Olin,
January 12, 1888), and innocent purchasers for value, add that "the vendor's rights to follow the property
into the hands of third parties or to
sue them for a conversion, are made to
depend upon the good faith of the
transaction, and, where the purchse
is made from the vendee in good faith

ces in which the original vendor must
have known or contemplated that the
mill machinery ' would be sold by his
vendee,' a millwright, and placed in
the mill of the defendants and so ' incorporated in, or made a part of, the
freehold, his, the vendor's,' rights
have been made subservient to those
of the innocent purchaser :" Jenks v.
Colwell, June 23, 1887.
In Miontana, where a lease with the
privilege of purchase on payment of
a sum in addition to the rent, had expired, the cattle remained in the lessee's possession and the additional
sum had not been paid, the Court
Jield this no fraud upon the lessee's
creditors, as the parol agreement for
a conditional sale was valid even
against the creditors (citing llarkness
v. Russell, supra; Heinbockle v. Zngbaum, 5 Mont. 344 (1885), and Silver
Bow 1. 4- 3.
Co. v. Lowry, 6 Id.
288 (1887); M1iles v. Edsall, S. Ct.
Montana, July 29, 1887.
In Nerada a conditional sale passes
no title which can be taken into execution by the buyer's creditors, until
the performance of the condition, unless the condition is waived by an
absolute and unconditioned delivery
of the property: Cardinalv. Edwards,
5 Nev. 36 (1869).
In New Jersey and lNew .Atexico the
Courts uphold the conditional sales
even against purchasers without notice for a valuable consideration, of
chattels brought from another State,
and chattel mortgages and conveyances which create the relation of
debtor and creditor are distinguished
from such sales: 3farvin Safe Co. v.
Norton, 48 N. J. Law, 410 (1886);
Redewill v. Gillen, S. Ct. New lex.
January 19, 1887.
In Oregon the Supreme Court, as
recently as February 29, 1888 (Schneider v. Lee et al.), refused to depart

RAWSON MANUFACTURING CO. v. RICHARDS.
from the former decisions of The Singer
Alfg. Co. v. Graham et al., 8 Oregon,
17 (1879), and Rosendorf et al. v.
Baker, Id. 240 (1880), and again held
that a sale to a bona fide purchaser
would convey no title as against the
seller, of personalty, upon condition
of retaining title until payment in
full. The Court felt "sustained by
such high authority as that of the
Supreme Court of the U. S." in Harkness v. Russell, supra.
Rhode Island: the right of the conditional vendee is merely a right resting in contract and not subject to attachment: Goodell v. Fairbrother, 12
R. 1.233 (1878) ; though, where there
is possession and the right to use the
machinery conditionally sold a sale or
mortgage, sv.hlect to the payment of
the price, may be made: Carpenter v.
Scott, 13 R. I. 477 (1881).
In Tennessee, Utah, and Washington
Territory a conditional sale is valid,
and a purchaser from the vendee acquires no title, unless the vendee is
clothed with authority to sell: Wilder
6"Co. v. Wilson, 16 Lea, 548 (1886) ;
De Saint Germain et al. v. Wi7nd, S.
Ct. Wash. Terr. February 4, 1887;
Harkness v. Russell, 118 U. S. 663
(1886).
In Wyoming conditional sales are
valid, even against the purchaser for
a valuable consideration, without notice, from the assignee for the benefit
of creditors of the conditional buyer.
Such sales are not within the statute
relating to chattel mortgages : Warner
v. Roth, 2 Wy. Rep. 63 (1879).
From the statutes quoted it is clear
that uniformity of local legislation is
not beyond hope, and, as a step in
that direction, the following is suggested as a general law on the subject
of conditional sales: "Be it enacted,
etc., that no sale, lease, bailment, or
other transfer of personal property,
where the possession of such property
VOL. XXXVI.-78

is delivered to the buyer, lessee,
bailee, or other transferee, upon condition that the title to such property
shall remain in the seller, lessor,
bailor, or other transferrer, until payment of certain sum or sums or the
performance of certain acts, shall be
of any validity against the future
creditors of such buyer, lessee, bailee,
or other transferee, or against his
pledgee, lessee, mortgagee, or vendee,
without notice of such condition, unless, and only so far as the ternis of
such conditional sale, lease, bailnent,
or other transfer, shall be reduced to
writing, executed, and acknowledged
by both parties to the contract, and
recorded in the (county) where the
property is at the time of such recording, and also recorded in every other
(county) to which such property may
be removed from time to time before
the performance of the condition.
Provided, nevertheless, that when specific articles are sold, leased, bailed, or
otherwise transferred, and are distinctly marked with the words ' conditionally sold by A. B. to C. D.,' it
shall not be necessary to record the
contract but only to reduce it to writing and execute and acknowledge it
as aforesaid."
"§ 2. Parol evidence and other
writings detached from the recorded
contract shall not be competent evidence to vary the contract executed
and acknowledged as aforesaid."
Further details are not so important
that local variations should be deplored in their practical effects at
present.
While not within the scope of th-i
annotation, it is to be generally noted
that the law of the situs, and not of
the contract, prevails : Barney, etc.,
Co. v. Hart, Receiver, Ct. App. Ky.
Sept. 16, 1886; Miarvi Safe Co. v.
Norton, 48 N. J. Law, 410 (1886);
Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S.250 (1878).
JoHN B. UILE.

